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Tax Treaties For Investment And Aid To
Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study
Allison Christians
Abstract
Tax treaties are believed to increase cross-border trade and investment by reduc-
ing international tax burdens. The pursuit of tax treaties is therefore advanced as
an integral component of U.S. foreign aid policy, which increasingly favors indi-
rect assistance in the form of fostering trade and investment over traditional direct
assistance in the form of donor funding. The importance of tax treaties is espe-
cially advanced in the context of U.S. relations with Sub-Saharan Africa, where
poverty-related conditions are extreme and foreign trade and investment minimal.
Yet despite many years of consistent promotion there are currently no tax treaties
between the United States and the developing countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.
This article explains the apparent contradiction by presenting as a test case a hy-
pothetical tax treaty between the U.S. and Ghana. The case study illustrates that in
today’s global commercial climate, traditional tax treaties provide few tax benefits
to and indeed may negatively impact private investors. Consequently, the contin-
uing absence of tax treaties can be explained by the lack of incentives for private
investors to pressure the U.S. government to conclude these agreements. This ar-
ticle concludes that means other than increasing the international network of tax
treaties must be pursued if the goal to increase trade and investment to developing
countries is to be achieved.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. is committed to increasing trade and investment to less 
developed countries (LDCs),1 particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
 
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin; Visiting Assistant Professor of 
Law, Northwestern University.  I thank Professors Reuven Avi-Yonah, Yariv Brauner, 
David Cameron, Kwame Gyan, Michael McIntyre, and Robert Peroni, as well as Justice 
Margaret Insaidoo and Kweku Ackaah-Boafo, Esq., for their many helpful comments and 
suggestions.  This Article benefited from a colloquium at the Brooklyn Law School 
(International Economic Law Forum).  I am grateful for the generous financial support for 
this research, provided under a grant by The Educational Partnership Programs Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Education for Development and 
Democracy Initiative; as well as financial and academic support from the University of 
Ghana, Faculty of Law and the Northwestern University School of Law. 
1 There is no uniform convention for the designation of a country as “less developed.”  
The term is generally used to reflect a country’s economic status or growth potential.  In 
the context of taxation, these labels may be used to distinguish “in a general way between 
countries with highly developed, sophisticated tax systems and those whose tax systems are 
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where poverty-related conditions are extreme and foreign trade and 
investment minimal.2  This commitment is demonstrated in U.S. efforts to 
negotiate agreements to eliminate trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas 
with many of these countries.3  U.S. officials also consistently proclaim a 
commitment to enter into tax treaties with LDCs,4 on the theory that tax 
treaties can eliminate excessive taxation and therefore help to increase trade 
                                                                                                                            
at an earlier stage of development.”  VICTOR THURONYI, TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING, 
xxvii (1996).  In the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) delineates three 
categories in a hierarchy, consisting of 35 “developed countries,” 27 “former 
USSR/Eastern Europe,” and 172 “less developed countries” (all other recognized countries, 
including all of Sub-Saharan Africa except South Africa).  See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2004 (hereinafter WORLD FACTBOOK 2004), at  
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ (LDCs defined in Appendix B).  As a rough 
guide to U.S. foreign policy, this article incorporates these terms.  For a discussion of the 
arbitrary and often unyielding nature of these designations despite changes in a particular 
country’s economic status or prospects, see What’s in a name?, THE ECONOMIST, January 
17th 2004. 
2 Since the late 1980s, increasing trade with and investment in LDCs has become a 
preferred means of providing aid to such countries.  See, e.g., Paul B. Thompson, THE 
ETHICS OF TRADE AND AID 2 (1992); see also Bruce Zagaris, The Procedural Aspects of 
U.S. Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries: Too Many Sticks and No Carrots?, 35 G. 
W. INT’L L. REV. 331, 384 (2003) (the “official policies” of the U.S. are “to mobilize 
private capital rather than foreign aid”).  For an overview of poverty conditions and foreign 
investment in African nations, see, e.g., UNCTAD, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 
AFRICA: PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL 1, 2, 21 (United Nations 1999) (foreign investors 
typically associate Africa with “pictures of civil unrest, starvation, deadly diseases and 
economic disorder,” and foreign investment “inflows into Africa have increased only 
modestly” since the 1980s). 
3 The main agreement is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a trade 
preference agreement, discussed infra at note 18.  The U.S. is also currently negotiating a 
free trade agreement with the South African Customs Union (comprised of South Africa, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland).  See United States Trade Representative, 
Background Information on the U.S.-SACU FTA, at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/ 
Southern_Africa_FTA/Background_Information_on_the_U.S.-SACU_FTA.html. 
4 See, e.g., U.S. Treasury Dept. Press Rel. JS-1809, Treasury Welcomes Entry into 
Force of U.S.-Sri Lanka Income Tax Treaty (July 22, 2004) (“The Treasury Department is 
committed to continuing to extend and broaden the U.S. tax treaty network, including new 
agreements with emerging economies”), SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, 108TH 
CONG., HEARING ON JAPANESE AND THE SRI LANKA TAX PROTOCOL (February 25, 2004), 
2004 WL 363565 (F.D.C.H.) (“we are trying to expand the scope of these treaties to 
developing countries”), and Joseph H. Guttentag, An Overview of International Tax Issues, 
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 445, 450 (1996) (“tax treaty expansion in this area is a high Treasury 
priority”).  The U.S. currently has 16 tax treaties with LDCs: Barbados, China, Cyprus, 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Korea, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Venezuela.   
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and investment between the partner countries.5  As such, tax treaties appear 
to be a perfect complement to trade agreements in furthering U.S. efforts to 
increase trade and investment to LDCs.  Yet there are currently no tax 
treaties in force between the U.S. and any of the LDCs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.6   
The lack of tax treaties between the U.S. and the LDCs of Sub-Saharan 
Africa cannot be explained by disinterest or lack of support on the part of 
academics, practitioners, or lawmakers.  Representatives from all sectors 
have urged the importance of concluding these agreements.7  Neither can 
the omission be attributed to disinterest on the part of the LDCs in Sub-
 
 
5 This theory has been officially propounded since the first independent U.S.-LDC 
treaty was contemplated.  See John F. Dulles, Letter of Transmittal to the President, July 9, 
1956, reprinted in STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TAX CONVENTIONS 1445 (1962) (Proclaiming 
that a treaty with Honduras would increase U.S. investment in that country because “by 
eliminating double taxation….[tax treaties] have contributed much to the trade and 
investment flowing between [partner] countries and the United States”).  For a recent 
restatement of the theory, see Barbara Angus, International Tax Counsel, before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations on Pending Income Tax Agreements, February 25, 2004 
(in regards to a proposed treaty with Sri Lanka, “[t]he goal of the tax treaty is to increase 
the amount and efficiency of economic activity” between the partner countries). 
6 The U.S. tax treaty network at one time included ten LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
pursuant to extensions of existing tax treaties with the U.K. and Belgium.  All of these 
treaties were subsequently terminated.  Treasury Dept. News Rel. (R-2222, July 1, 1983).  
Today, the only Sub-Saharan African country with a U.S. tax treaty is South Africa, which 
is considered to be a developed country.  See supra, note 1.  Ethiopia, Ghana, and Liberia 
each have a treaty with the U.S. that deals solely with the taxation of income from shipping 
and aircraft activity; these agreements are largely unnecessary due to parallel provisions in 
U.S. domestic tax law.  See Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended (hereinafter, IRC) 
§ 883.  
7 See, e.g., Karen B. Brown, Missing Africa: Should U.S. International Tax Rules 
Accommodate  Investment in Developing Countries? 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 45, 46 
(2002) (arguing for tax treaties between the U.S. and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa); 
Calvin J. Allen, United States Should Expand Tax Treaty Network in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
34 TAX NOTES INT’L 20 (March 19, 2004) (same); Statement by Michael A. Samuels, 
House Ways and Means (August 1, 1996), 1996 WL 433282 (F.D.C.H.) (“Given the vital 
role that investment must play in the development of African countries…the new policy 
must contain several key investment-related priorities, including an emphasis on bilateral 
investment and tax treaties.”); Richard G. Lugar, Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Hearing (March 25, 2004), 2004 WL 623421 (F.D.C.H.) (supporting legislation that 
“directs the Secretary of the Treasury to seek negotiations regarding tax treaties with 
[AGOA] eligible countries”); and Charles B. Rangel, The State of Africa: The Benefits of 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act—Next Steps, 149 CONG. REC. E1464-01, 2003 
WL 21643348 (July 14, 2003) (stating that the U.S. should negotiate tax treaties with 
AGOA countries). 
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Saharan Africa themselves.8  Many of these nations have long pursued tax 
treaties with the U.S,9 and a few have gone so far as to formally and 
publicly express their interest in commencing negotiations with the U.S.10 
Finally, the lack of tax treaties cannot be charged to a lack of real 
commitment on the part of the U.S. to conclude agreements that will 
increase trade and investment to and assist in the economic growth of the 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.11  This commitment has already been 
demonstrated through the making of significant concessions, including the 
foregoing of revenue in the form of direct aid as well as reduced tariffs, in 
the context of trade and aid agreements with these countries.12 
 
 
8 All of the LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa are in urgent if not desperate need for foreign 
capital, and most are responding to the need by implementing measures to make their 
countries more attractive to foreign investors.  Given the powers ascribed to tax treaties in 
increasing trade and investment between partner countries, most LDCs would pursue the 
opportunity to commence negotiations with the U.S. (provided that the concessions 
required to secure such agreements are not too great). 
9 For example, Nigeria began pursuing a tax treaty with the United States in 1978, after 
it unilaterally withdrew from its coverage under an extension of the 1945 tax treaty 
between the U.K. and the U.S (as a former U.K. territory).  See supra note 6 (discussing the 
treaty extension), and Announcement 78-147, 1978-41 I.R.B. 20 (Oct. 10, 1978) 
(terminating the treaty).  Although it was apparently negotiated at length, the tax treaty was 
never completed. 
10 Calvin J. Allen, Botswana, Burundi Wish to Negotiate Tax Treaties with United 
States, 26 TAX NOTES INT’L 1264 (2002).  This is a rather unusual event, since tax treaties 
are generally commenced and negotiated in secret.  Their existence is usually made public 
after negotiations have concluded and the treaty has been signed by the respective 
countries, pending ratification.  RICHARD E. ANDERSEN & PETER H. BLESSING, ANALYSIS 
OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES, ¶ 1.04[1][a][i], [ii], 1998 WL 1038746.  Thus, 
countries don’t usually issue public proclamations regarding their desire to enter into tax 
treaties.  Similarly, since there is little public disclosure regarding progress in treaty-
making by the U.S. Treasury Department, there is little means to determine the reaction, if 
any, Treasury has had to these or other requests to initiate negotiations.    
11 See Miranda Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse  of Tax 
Reform in Developing and Transition Countries, 44 HARV. INT'L L. J. 139, 148-149 (2003) 
(pointing to the number of U.S. treaties with other emerging economies as evidence that 
“the lack of U.S. treaty-making with [LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa] cannot be explained 
solely by a general reluctance to enter into tax treaties with less developed or non-capitalist 
countries”); Richard Mitchell, United States-Brazil Bilateral Income Tax Treaty 
Negotiations, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 209, 225 (1997) (“the United States 
displays eagerness to enter into tax treaties with developing nations”). 
12 The main agreements are the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a 
preferential trade regime, discussed infra at note 18, and the recently introduced 
Millennium Challenge Act, an aid package tied to countries’ demonstrated commitment to 
growth through investment and trade, discussed infra at note 19 . 
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That the lack of tax treaties cannot be explained by disinterest, lack of 
support, or lack of commitment on the part of individuals or governments 
suggests that there must be some other reason or reasons that tax treaties 
have not been concluded between the U.S. and the LDCs of Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  This article explores some of these reasons by presenting as a test 
case a hypothetical tax treaty between the U.S. and Ghana, one of the LDCs 
of Sub-Saharan Africa.13  Hypothesizing the structure and operation of a tax 
treaty between these two countries provides a vehicle for measuring the 
potential effect of such a treaty on international commerce.  The case study 
demonstrates that in today’s global tax climate, a typical tax treaty would 
not provide significant tax benefits to current or potential investors.  
Consequently, there is little incentive for these investors to pressure the 
U.S. government to conclude tax treaties with many LDCs.   
There are of course any number of other reasons why tax treaties may 
not be concluded between the U.S. and the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
including competing priorities, either for tax treaties with other countries or 
for other domestic or international tax matters.  Undoubtedly, socio-political 
factors play an important role as well.14  However, this article argues that 
since tax treaties with LDCs like Ghana would not provide major tax 
benefits to the private sector, two results occur.   
First, not surprisingly, there is likely to be little private sector demand or 
support for the conclusion of these agreements.  Second, there is little 
reason to believe that, even if concluded, tax treaties between the U.S. and 
Sub-Saharan Africa could ever have the significant impact on cross-border 
investment and trade so consistently proclaimed by treaty proponents.  This 
article concludes from these observations that if the U.S. is truly committed 
to increasing investment and trade to the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa, an 
examination of how the global tax climate has changed is in order.  We 
must acknowledge that tax treaties cannot deliver the promised benefits, and 
examine the factors that prevent them from so doing.  
An overview of the background and function of tax treaties and their 
proclaimed benefits are discussed in Part II of this article.  Part III presents 
the case study of a hypothetical tax treaty between the U.S. and Ghana and 
shows that such a treaty would produce few tax benefits to current or 
 
 
13 Ghana was chosen as a subject for this case study for several reasons, including its 
existing commercial ties to the U.S., as described in Part III. 
14 For example, there may be national interests at stake, such as security, defense, or 
energy supply issues, that may contribute to the prioritization of concluding tax treaties 
with LDCs in other areas of the world, such as Sri Lanka (concluded in 2004) and 
Bangladesh (currently pending ratification).  The various foreign policy goals that motivate 
the agenda for treaty-making is a subject that deserves much attention, but is beyond the 
scope of this article. 
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potential investors and would therefore be largely ineffective in stimulating 
trade and investment between these two countries.  Part IV concludes that 
after decades of adherence to the promise of tax treaties, we must 
acknowledge their failure to deliver, and search for alternative ways to 
achieve the goal of promoting aid through the vehicles of investment and 
trade. 
II. BACKGROUND: TAX TREATIES, INVESTMENT, AND TRADE 
This Part provides the context for a discussion of the role of tax treaties 
in delivering investment and aid to LDCs.  Section A describes some of the 
strategies employed by the U.S. to assist LDCs, and how tax treaties 
comport with these strategies.  Section B explains the role tax treaties play 
as the locus of international tax law, by outlining the purposes and goals 
that surrounded the origin and evolution of these agreements.  Section C 
discusses the limitations that arise because international tax law concepts 
are embodied in a network of overlapping, varying, and mostly bilateral 
agreements between select nations, and introduces some of the problems 
faced by the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa, which operate largely outside of 
this network. 
A. U.S. Strategy for Assistance to LDCs 
As discussed in the introduction, the U.S. has adopted a foreign aid 
strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa that centers on the idea that creating 
investment and trade opportunities for LDCs will most effectively boost 
economic growth in these countries, thereby lifting them out of poverty 
through commercial interaction with the global community.15  A key 
component of this foreign aid strategy is therefore the identification and 
elimination of barriers to trade and investment.  Among the most significant 
potential barriers are double taxation, which occurs when two countries 
impose similar taxes on the same taxpayer in respect of the same income, 
regulatory barriers, such as exchange and other market controls, and tariffs.  
These barriers have historically been addressed in very different ways.   
Regulatory barriers and tariffs have been addressed by most countries in 
a generally uniform manner through regional and global trade agreements.16  
The main multilateral agreement is the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), with respect to which 147 countries are signatories through 
 
 
15 See supra, note 2. 
16 Regulatory barriers are also addressed, to a lesser extent, in bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs), as discussed at Part III.D, infra. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art20
2005] Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid 7 
 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).17  Additional tariff and regulatory 
barrier reduction between the U.S. and Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
accomplished through The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), 
an agreement that seeks to increase growth and alleviate poverty through 
the elimination of tariffs and quotas for selected imports from designated 
Sub-Saharan African nations,18 and the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 
(MCA), a new official direct assistance initiative that will direct foreign aid 
only to countries demonstrating a commitment to poverty reduction through 
economic growth.19 
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD),20 the harmful effects of double taxation on cross-
 
 
17 37 of the 47 LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa are members of the WTO.  These GATT 
and other agreements are available on the WTO website at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm1_e.htm. 
18 The Trade and Development Act of 2000, H. R. 434-21, 19 U.S.C. 3721, more 
commonly known as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA I), as amended by 
Section 3108 of The Trade Act of 2002 (AGOA II), and as further amended by The AGOA 
Acceleration Act of 2004, signed by President Bush on July 12, 2004 (AGOA III; the three 
acts are collectively referred to herein as AGOA).  AGOA eliminates “competitive need 
limitations” (quotas) and tariffs on over 1,800 items that would otherwise be subject to 
such constraints under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (unless 
otherwise exempt under a free trade agreement).  AGOA § 103(2); see also USITC 
Publication 3653 (2004), available at www.usitc.gov; see also 
http://www.agoa.gov/faq/faq.html#q17.  AGOA is a preferential trade regime, rather than a 
free trade agreement.  For a discussion of AGOA and other trade and aid initiatives entered 
into with Sub-Saharan Africa over the past several years up to 2002, see Brown, supra note 
7, at 45, 49-51.  As of March, 2005, 36 of the 47 LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa were eligible 
for AGOA benefits.  For a list of currently-eligible countries, see the AGOA website, at 
http://www.agoa.gov/eligibility/country_eligibility.html 
19 The Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-199, Division D; see Bill to 
Establish Millennium Challenge Account and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, S. 
571, 108th Cong., 1st. Sess., March 6, 2003.  For information on the MCA, see the MCA 
website, available at http://www.mca.gov/; see also Colin Powell, Welcome Message from 
The Honorable Colin L. Powell, available at http://www.mca.gov/ (stating that the MCA 
“reflects a new international consensus that development aid produces the best results when 
it goes to countries that adopt pro-growth strategies for meeting political, social and 
economic challenges.”).  The MCA is not solely directed at Sub-Saharan Africa, but over 
half of its currently identified recipient countries are located in this region. 
20 The OECD is an international organization consisting of 30 member countries, all of 
which are developed countries with the nominal exception of South Korea, which the CIA 
still considers an LDC despite its per capita GDP of $17,800, well over the typical $10,000 
threshold separating developed from less-developed, and despite the fact that just 4% of the 
population is considered to be living in poverty conditions.  See WORLD FACTBOOK 2004, 
supra note 1 (Appendix B provides a definition of LDCs that includes the “Four Tigers,” a 
group which includes South Korea, and country data on South Korea provides GDP and 
poverty statistics, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ 
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border trade and investment “are so well known that it is scarcely necessary 
to stress the importance of removing the obstacles that double taxation 
presents to the development of economic relations between countries.”21  
The U.S. government mirrors this sentiment, identifying the elimination of 
“tax barriers” as a major component of its dedication “to eliminating 
unnecessary barriers to cross-border trade and investment.”22 
Yet, unlike other barriers to trade and investment, double taxation has 
not been reconciled on a global scale.  Instead of a world tax organization to 
coordinate efforts and resolve disputes,23 relieving double taxation remains 
the purview of individual countries.24  Nevertheless, a consensus has 
                                                                                                                            
ks.html).  As discussed below, the OECD developed and continually updates a model 
income tax convention that both encapsulates and sets international tax standards. 
21 OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND 
ON CAPITAL 7 (Jan. 28, 2003). 
22 Treasury Press Release JS-1786, supra note 5; see also Treasury Press Release JS-
1267, Treasury Welcomes Senate Approval of New U.S.-Sri Lanka Tax Treaty (March 26, 
2004), at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1267.htm (stating that the new treaty with 
Sri Lanka is “an important step in our ongoing efforts to broaden the reach of our tax treaty 
network.”); Treasury Press Release JS-1809, supra note 4 (“This new tax treaty 
relationship will serve to eliminate tax barriers to cross-border trade and investment 
between the two countries…[by providing] greater certainty to taxpayers with respect to 
the tax treatment of their cross-border activities and [reducing] the potential for double 
taxation of income from such activities.”) 
23 See “What is the WTO?,” at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ 
whatis_e/whatis_e.htm.  The several international organizations concerned with 
standardizing and coordinating global taxation do not approach the level of member 
country participation in the WTO.  For example, the OECD is one of the primary 
international organizations that concerns itself with setting standards for international 
taxation, but it has only 30 members, few new members are added (the latest addition was 
the Slovak Republic, in 2000), and many countries with rapidly growing economies, such 
as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, are not members. 
24 The vast majority of international agreements that address the problem of double 
taxation are bilateral.  However, there are a few regional multilateral tax treaties currently 
in force, including the Andean Pact Income Tax Convention between Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela (November 16, 1971); the Arab Economic Unity Council 
Tax Treaty between Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (Y.A.R.) 
(December 3, 1973); the Agreement Among the Governments of the Member States of the 
Caribbean Community for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, Profits, or Gains and Capital Gains and for the 
Encouragement of Regional Trade and Investment between the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) countries of Antigua, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Montserrat, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and 
Trinidad and Tobago (July 6, 1994); the Tax Convention Between the Member States of 
the West African Economic Community (C.E.A.O.) between Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal (October 29, 1984); the Agreement on the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation on Personal Income and Property, signed by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art20
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emerged regarding the appropriate tax treatment of cross border investment 
activity.25  Under this consensus, double taxation is addressed primarily by 
tax treaties, which allocate tax revenue among jurisdictions based on 
concepts of residence and source.26    
Thus, the United States, along with the rest of the developed world, has 
a network of tax treaties, spanning most of its major trading partners across 
the globe.27  Expanding the tax treaty network is alternately termed a 
commitment, an ongoing effort,28 and the “primary means” for the 
elimination of tax barriers to international trade and investment.29  Officials 
from other countries echo these sentiments.30   
From the perspective of LDCs, a major problem with embodying 
international tax laws in tax treaties is that LDCs typically have few of these 
treaties in place.  But the tax treaty network, with its central role in the 
evolution of international tax law, directly affects these countries regardless 
of their level of inclusion.  To demonstrate the extent of this influence, the 
following Section discusses why and how tax treaties became the source of 
international tax law, and explores the impact the international tax system 
has had on the conclusion of tax treaties between the U.S. and the LDCs of 
Sub-Saharan Africa.31   
                                                                                                                            
Germany (G.D.R.), Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union, and still 
in force with respect to various successor states (May 27, 1977); and the Convention 
Between the Nordic Countries for the Avoidance of Double Taxation With Respect to 
Taxes on Income and on Capital, between Denmark, the Faeroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, and Sweden (September 23, 1996) (generally based on the OECD Model).    
25 For an introduction to the evolution of international taxation from decisions and 
compromises made by the U.S. and the League of Nations in the 1920s to the “flawed 
miracle” that exists today, see Reuven Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: 
A Proposal For Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1996). 
26 Id. 
27 See discussion infra, text at notes 96 and 97. 
28 Treasury Press Release JS-1267, supra note 22. 
29 Treasury Press Release JS-1786, supra note 5.  See also Treasury Press Rel. JS-
1809, supra note 4, and Gregory F. Jenner, U.S. Treasury Thanks Senator for Comments on 
Possible Chile-U.S. Tax Treaty, 2004 WTD 83-16 (Apr. 22, 2004) (“Income tax treaties 
can serve the important purpose of addressing tax-related barriers to cross-border trade and 
investment”). 
30 For example, Bangladeshi officials assert that when the new treaty between the U.S. 
and Bangladesh enters into force, it “will encourage U.S. investment in the education, 
highway, and communication sectors in Bangladesh,”  U.S. Treaty Update, 15 J. of Int’l 
Tax. 4 (December 2004). 
31 See, e.g., Michael A. Samuels, supra note 7, Richard G. Lugar, supra note 7, and 
Charles B. Rangel, supra note 7.   
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B. Origins of Tax Treaties as International Law 
Every country establishes its jurisdiction to impose income taxation 
under sovereign claim of right.  In the U.S., the taxation of income from 
international transactions turns on whether the income is earned by a 
resident32 or a non-resident.33  In the case of residents, the U.S purports to 
tax “all income from whatever source derived.”34  In the case of non-
residents, the U.S. taxing jurisdiction is generally limited to income derived 
from investments and business activities carried out in the U.S.35  Most 
developed countries similarly impose worldwide, or residence-based, 
income taxation on residents, and source-based taxation on income earned 
within their borders.36  As a result, ample potential exists for double 
taxation of transactions between two developed countries.37 The U.S. and 
most of the other countries that impose worldwide taxation therefore 
provide a foreign tax credit, which removes the residence-based layer of tax 
while preserving the source-based layer.38  Thus, the U.S. and most other 
countries generally relieve double taxation on a unilateral basis, under 
statutory law.  
 
 
32 Whether individual or entity; see IRC § 7701(a)(1). 
33 IRC §§ 7701, et seq. 
34 IRC § 61, see also IRC § 1 and 11(a), Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1-1(c) and 1.11-1(a).  The 
authority to extend its jurisdiction in this broad fashion is confirmed by Cook v. Tait, 265 
U.S. 47 (1924) (“the basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made dependent upon 
the situs of the property in all cases, it being in or out of the United States, nor was not and 
cannot be made dependent upon the domicile of the citizen, that being in or out of the 
United States, but upon his relation as citizen to the United States and the relation of the 
latter to him as citizen”). 
35 IRC §§ 871, 881-882. 
36 OECD countries generally impose some form of worldwide taxation, although a few 
(Austria, Australia, and Switzerland) provide certain statutory exemptions, and many 
provide for exemption under treaty, as discussed below.  Some countries such as France are 
generally source-based, or territorial systems, which generally refrain from taxing the 
foreign income earned by their residents.  However, these countries enforce worldwide 
taxation of certain kinds of income earned in low-tax jurisdictions in order to prevent 
capital flight.  Thus, France imposes worldwide taxation on certain low-taxed foreign 
income.  For tax system features and rates, see generally Ernst & Young, WORLDWIDE 
CORPORATE TAX GUIDE 2004. 
37 The most common form of double taxation occurs upon a residence-source overlap, 
as a taxpayer’s country of residence (the home country) imposes residence-based tax on 
income earned in a foreign (source, or host) country, while the  host country imposes 
source-based tax on the same item.  Source-source and residence-residence overlaps may 
also occur due to differing definitions of these concepts. 
38 See generally Ernst & Young, supra note 36. 
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The same result is attained under treaties.  Treaties are contracts, 
generally between two countries,39 under which the signatory countries 
agree to the taxation each will impose on the activities carried out between 
their respective jurisdictions.40  Because the U.S. unilaterally provides a 
mechanism to prevent U.S. taxation in the event foreign taxation applies, 
treaties aimed at relieving double taxation would appear to be duplicative.41  
Indeed, treaties might seem unnecessary ab initio, since the U.S. provided 
the foreign tax credit mechanism almost immediately following the 
inception of the income tax itself, indeed decades before any tax treaties 
were ever negotiated.42 Nevertheless, the U.S. began entering into tax 
treaties in 1932 and the practice continues to the present.43   
 
 
39 But see supra, note 24. 
40 In the U.S., treaties have the same effect as acts of Congress, and are equivalent to 
any other U.S. law.  U.S. Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2; see American Trust Co. v J.G. Smyth, 
247 F.2d 149 (1957); J. Samann v Commissioner, 313 F2d 461 (1963); and Dames & More 
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686-88 (1981).  As such, they are subject to and may be overridden 
by subsequent revisions in domestic law (“treaty override”) under the “last in time” rule of 
IRC § 7852(d).  See Philip F. Postlewaite & David S. Makarski, The ALI Tax Treaty 
Study—A Critique and a Modest Proposal, 52 BULL. SEC. TAX’N 731, 740 (1998-1999) 
(arguing that treaty override is seen as a “serious problem” because it potentially places the 
U.S. in violation of existing international obligations); Richard L. Doernberg, Overriding 
Tax Treaties: The U.S. Perspective, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 71 (1995) (discussing treaty 
override in the U.S. and concluding that “these provisions embody an important contractual 
principle”: that breach of an obligation is desirable when “what is gained from the party 
that breaches exceeds what is lost by the party against whom the breach occurred,” thus a 
breach might be appropriate as long as the United States compensates the aggrieved party). 
41 See generally, Elisabeth Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their Role in 
Relieving Double Taxation, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 428 (1963) (arguing that treaties play a 
relatively small role in relieving double taxation, owing to the U.S. foreign tax credit); see 
also Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 939 (2000) 
(showing that tax treaties are not needed to relieve double taxation, since each country 
would find it in its own best interest to unilaterally relieve double taxation on its citizens 
and residents). 
42 After a brief and limited stint during the civil war, the income tax was re-introduced 
in 1913.  See STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS 5, 278 (2002).  The foreign tax 
credit was enacted quickly thereafter, in 1918.  See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18. 222(a)(1), 
238(a), 240(c), 40 Stat. 1057, 1073, 1080-1082 (1919).  Section 222(a)(1) was applicable 
to individuals, 238(a) to corporations, and 240(c) defined the taxes for which credit would 
be allowed. 
43 The first U.S. tax treaty was signed with France in 1932 and entered into force on 
April 9, 1935.  Since then, the U.S. tax treaty network has grown by an average of one 
treaty per year, based on the entry-in-force dates of all U.S. tax treaties ever entered into 
force.  The most recent treaty to enter into force is with Sri Lanka.  See Convention for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes 
On Income, Mar. 14, 1985, U.S.-Sri Lanka, TIAS (entered into force Jun. 13, 2004).  The 
most recently signed is with Bangladesh, which was signed on September 26, 2004 but has 
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One of the original reasons to enter into treaties was that before they 
existed, there was no international standard for relieving double taxation: 
the U.S. was alone in providing a comprehensive foreign tax credit that 
unilaterally relieved residence-based taxation.44  The effect of unilateral 
relief of double taxation was seen as a “present of revenue to other 
countries,” for whom the possibility of source-based taxation was 
preserved.45  In stark contrast, Britain imposed worldwide taxation and 
provided a foreign tax credit that was extremely limited and generally 
preserved its residence-based taxation.46  Other European nations, especially 
Italy and France, relied heavily on source-based taxation and therefore 
vigorously defended the U.S. position of ceding residence-based taxation to 
that of source.47   
The conflicting views of the U.S. and the U.K. about the proper method 
for relieving double taxation prompted several years of debate out of which 
a consensus finally emerged.48  Under this consensus, “personal taxation” 
                                                                                                                            
not yet entered into force.  See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes On Income, Sept. 26, U.S.-Bangl., 
TIAS; see also Muhammad Kibria, Bangladesh, United States Sign Tax Treaty, 2004 WTD 
188-3 (Sep. 28, 2004). 
44 H. David Rosenbloom & Stanley I. Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy: An 
Overview, 19 COL. J. TRANSN’L. L. 359 (1981); Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, 
The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L. J. 1021, 1023 (1997). 
45 Edwin R. A. Seligman, Double Taxation and International Fiscal Cooperation, 133-
35 n.10 (1928). Source-based taxation was even enhanced to the extent the foreign 
country’s tax rates were lower than that of the U.S.  In such cases, foreign countries could 
raise their tax rates to the U.S. level with the assurance that these taxes would be creditable 
in the U.S., leaving the investor indifferent as to the higher foreign rate.  See Richard E. 
Caves, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 190 (1996) (“Neutrality 
depends on who pays what tax, not which government collects it.”). 
46 Britain’s view was supported by the Netherlands.  Both countries were primarily 
capital-exporting nations, and thus the importance of preserving residence-based taxation 
was high.  The U.S. was also a capital-exporting nation at the time, but favored the primacy 
of source-based taxation.  Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 44. 
47 Id. 
48 Discussions began in the newly formed International Chamber of Commerce in 
1920.  In 1921 the ICC adopted a resolution that taxing jurisdiction turned on the nature of 
the tax, with distinctions being made between “super” and “normal” taxes.  However, the 
U.S. rejected this resolution and endorsed closer adherence to the U.S. system, with 
exceptions made for particular kinds of income, including that from international shipping 
(as to which residence-based taxation was to be preserved) and that from sales of 
manufactured goods (to be apportioned under formula).  The ICC synthesized the views of 
the U.S. and fourteen other countries and produced a new resolution in Rome, in 1923.  
The League of Nations began to take over the discussions in 1923, using the Rome 
resolutions as a basis for discussion.  The compromise of the ICC as to “super” and 
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was to be preserved for residence-based taxation, and “impersonal taxation” 
was to be preserved for source.  How these terms would be defined and 
implemented in the context of the then vastly differing tax systems 
depended on long and contentious negotiations, held under the auspices of 
the League of Nations, in which the U.S. played a large part.49   
Ultimately, the League of Nations promulgated a model tax treaty under 
which countries would reciprocally restrict source-based taxation of passive 
income items such as dividends and interest, in favor of preserving 
residence jurisdiction over these items,50 and reciprocally relieve residence-
based taxation on foreign-source business income, as had been done 
unilaterally by the U.S. through the foreign tax credit.51  Thus, through tax 
treaties, the U.S. retreated from its position of unilaterally providing foreign 
tax credits.  The tax concessions thereby obtained from treaty partners 
reduced the revenue cost of the foreign tax credit, in accordance with the 
main goal of U.S involvement in first negotiating these instruments.52  
The concepts embodied in the League of Nations model treaty evolved 
into a model treaty developed by the OECD in 1963 and updated 
periodically since then (the OECD Model).53  The OECD Model has 
become the standard upon which most of the over 2,000 tax treaties 
currently in force are based.54  Following the League of Nations and OECD 
standards, tax treaties minimize source-based taxation of income derived 
from passive investment activity, such as dividends, interest and royalties, 
and preserve residence-based taxation of these items.  Once activities 
                                                                                                                            
“normal” taxes resurfaced in League of Nations discussions.  Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 
44, at 1067-1070. 
49 Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 44. 
50 Id, at 1086-1087 (citing Britain’s strong role in producing this result); Avi-Yonah 
(1996), supra note 25, at 1306. 
51 Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 44, at 1023.  The League of Nations first produced a 
model treaty in 1928. 
52 Mitchell B. Carroll, International Tax Law: Benefits for American Investors and 
Enterprises Abroad, 2 Int’l L. 692, 693-694 (1968) (“the American involvement was 
motivated by a desire to reduce foreign taxes on American business so as to reduce the 
costs of the foreign tax credit”). 
53 The OECD Model was itself based on a series of model treaties promulgated by the 
League of Nations.  It has since been updated several times to cope with the changing 
nature of business, culminating with the most recent update in 2003.  Unless otherwise 
noted, references in this article to the OECD Model refer to the 2003 version, which is 
available at www.oecd.org. 
54 Compiled from Ernst & Young, supra note 36, and the Tax Analysts Worldwide 
Tax Treaties database, as of February, 2005, available in Lexis Nexis. 
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increase to a sufficiently significant level of engagement, however, source-
based jurisdiction again takes precedence.55   
As a member of the OECD, the U.S. participated in the development of 
the OECD model, but also developed its own model to reflect specific 
policies (the US Model).56 First published in 1977 and most recently 
updated in 1996, the US Model is based on the OECD Model in most 
respects.57  One notable difference between the models is the OECD 
Model’s allowance of the alleviation of double taxation either via a foreign 
tax credit or by providing that the residence country will exempt the income 
earned in the source country (known as exemption).58  The US Model 
allows only the credit method, in keeping with its historical preference to 
impose worldwide taxation and alleviate double taxation via the foreign tax 
credit mechanism.59  All modern U.S. tax treaties are based on the U.S. 
Model, with modifications made to reflect changes in law or policy since 
the release of the latest model.60 
Worldwide income taxation is typically justified on the grounds that it 
promotes capital export neutrality (CEN), an efficiency principle under 
which taxpayers will not differentiate between locating activities 
domestically or abroad on tax grounds, since in either case the income 
generally will be subject to tax at the same rate. 61  Thus, if taxation is 
 
 
55 The required level of engagement is defined as a “permanent establishment” as 
discussed infra.   
56 Treasury Department Technical Explanation of the United States Model Income Tax 
Convention (September 20, 1996). 
57 The Joint Committee on Taxation compares provisions of both the US and OECD 
models when analyzing and describing new tax treaties entered into by the U.S..  See, e.g.,  
Testimony of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation Before the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations Hearing on the Proposed Tax Treaties with Japan and Sri Lanka 
(JCX-13-04), February 23, 2004 (explaining the use of the U.S. and OECD models in 
treaty negotiations and describing ways in which the new Japan-U.S. Treaty deviates from 
the U.S. and OECD models). 
58 OECD Model, Art. 23A (exemption method) and B (credit method).  For example, 
among OECD countries, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Poland have treaties 
in which they completely relinquish their residual taxation of income derived by a 
permanent establishment.  Ernst & Young, supra note 36.  For a recent example, see 
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Dec. 18, 1996, Belg.-Ecuador, U.N.T.S. 
(entered into force Mar. 18, 2004). 
59 See generally Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 44. 
60 A revised U.S. Model is apparently forthcoming from Treasury.  It was originally 
scheduled for release in December, 2004. 
61 Capital export neutrality and its converse, capital import neutrality, discussed infra, 
were first developed by Peggy Musgrave in 1969 and they have been vigorously analyzed 
and debated ever since.  Peggy Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment 
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imposed by a  source country, the U.S. as home country generally provides 
an offsetting tax credit against the U.S. tax imposed on the same item of 
income, leaving the U.S investor in the same tax position as if the 
investment had been subject only to domestic tax.62   
However, most countries, including the United States, do not 
completely adhere to CEN principles.  Because the U.S. generally does not 
tax the foreign income of foreign companies, it is a relatively simple matter 
to avoid U.S. tax on much foreign income by placing the income stream in a 
foreign entity.63  In so doing, U.S. persons may defer U.S. taxation until the 
foreign earnings are repatriated in the form of dividends or capital gains.64  
                                                                                                                            
Income: Issues and Arguments (1969).  For an overview of these norms, and an argument 
that capital export neutrality is generally the best principle for international taxation of both 
portfolio and direct investment, see Avi-Yonah (2000), supra note 158, at 1604.  See also 
Caves, supra note 45 (Stating that all relevant taxes taken together are neutral if domestic 
and overseas investments that earn the same pre-tax return also yield the same after-tax 
return); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON 
BUSINESS TAX ISSUES PREPARED FOR THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS TAX 
POLICY DISCUSSION SERIES 53-54 (Comm. Print 2002) (arguing that a worldwide tax 
system promotes economic efficiency, because investment location decisions will be 
governed by business considerations rather than tax considerations, and equity, because 
domestic and multinational activities are treated alike, and suggesting that worldwide 
taxation in some form is requisite to preserve the tax base from erosion by flight of 
activities to tax havens.)  A third norm, national neutrality, designates foreign taxes as a 
cost of doing business abroad, thereby indicating only a deduction for such taxes in the 
home country.  Consequently, under national neutrality, taxpayers are discouraged from 
engaging in foreign activities.  Only a few countries, such as Guinea and Mauritania, base 
their tax systems on national neutrality; others such as France and many of its former 
African colonies including Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, the French-controlled Congo, Gabon, 
and Senegal, as well as the Czech Republic and Hong Kong allow only a deduction for 
certain taxes paid but provide for a foreign tax credit for such taxes under treaty.  See 
generally Ernst & Young, supra note 36.   
62  If tax credits perfectly offset foreign taxes paid, the taxpayer is indifferent to the 
allocation of the tax.  See Caves, supra note 45.  Most foreign tax credit systems are not 
perfectly offsetting but impose limitations as to creditability of taxes based on type or 
source of income and amount paid relative to domestic tax otherwise imposed.  In the U.S., 
foreign taxes are currently segregated among several baskets according to the type of 
income that gave rise to the tax for purposes of applying a limit on the allowable tax credit.  
IRC §§ 901-904.  As a result, pooling of income from low-tax countries may be 
advantageous to taxpayers who have paid foreign taxes in excess of the allowable tax 
credit.  See, e.g., David R. Tillinghast, Tax Treaty Issues, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 455 (1996), 
Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated 
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1357, 1360 (2001).   
63 See, e.g., Julie A. Roin, United They Stand, Divided They Fall: Public Choice 
Theory and the Tax Code, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 113 (1988) (discussing the ease of 
avoiding U.S. tax through foreign entities); Avi-Yonah (1996), supra note 25, at 1324 
(arguing that as a result of the distinction between foreign and domestic companies in IRC 
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Deferral of this kind is the equivalent of a statutorily optional exemption 
of foreign income from U.S. taxation, as U.S. tax can be suspended 
indefinitely, according to the needs and desires of the shareholders.65 Thus 
deferral allows taxpayers to convert U.S. residence-based taxation to 
source-based taxation when it suits their purposes.66  To protect revenues, 
the U.S. has responded with a series of anti-deferral rules to prevent the 
easy escape of capital.67  To date, these anti-deferral measures have largely 
                                                                                                                            
7701(a)(4) and (5) and the ensuing difference in taxation under IRC §§ 11(d), 881, and 
882, “taxpayers can easily choose between classification as foreign or domestic according 
to the formal jurisdiction of their incorporation). 
64 Deferral is limited to some extent, as discussed infra, at Part III.B.  However, a U.S. 
person that earns active foreign income through a foreign corporation is generally not 
subject to U.S. tax until profits are repatriated as a dividend or the stock is sold, under the 
rules of Subpart F, §§ 951 et seq.   
65 To allow deferral is therefore to provide incentives for active business operations to 
be located outside of the U.S., in low-tax jurisdictions.  Robert J. Peroni, Back to the 
Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S. International Income Tax Rules, 51 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 975, 987 (1997) (arguing that deferral “undercuts the fairness and efficiency 
of the U.S. tax system” by allowing profits earned overseas in low-tax jurisdictions to 
escape tax while equivalent domestic activities would be subject to tax).  As a tax 
expenditure that costs the U.S. approximately $7.5 billion per year, deferral may be viewed 
as a subsidy, or tax incentive, for foreign business activities.  See Analytical Perspectives, 
Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005 287 (U.S. Government Printing 
office, 2004)  available at  http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2005/.  Capital gains 
may be avoidable in the context of a conversion or liquidation of a subsidiary.  See Dover 
v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. No. 19 (2004) (allowing the conversion of a foreign corporate 
subsidiary to disregarded entity status to avoid creation of subpart F income on its 
subsequent sale), however, the IRS disagrees with this conclusion.  See CCA 199937038 
(June 28, 1999) (holding that proceeds from sale of subsidiary after change in classification 
to disregarded entity did not escape subpart F) ; FSA 200049002 (August 4, 2000) (same) 
and FSA 200046008 (August 4, 2000) (same, with sale made to related party).  
66 See Peroni (1997), supra note 65. 
67 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 651 (1986) (“it is generally 
appropriate to impose current U.S. tax on easily movable income earned through a 
controlled foreign corporations since there is likely to be limited economic reason for the 
U.S. person’s use of the foreign corporation”).  In practice, current taxation applies to a 
significantly lesser extent than is contemplated under the subpart F rules, as these rules are 
apparently “not fully effective in meeting their objectives.”  Rosanne Altshuler, Harry 
Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, Has U.S. Investment Abroad Become More Sensitive to Tax 
Rates? in INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 9, 22, 28 (James R. 
Hines, Jr., ed., Univ. of Chicago Pr. 2001) (Less than 50% of after-tax income of 
subsidiaries located in three Caribbean tax havens was subject to current tax under subpart 
F); see also Robert J. Peroni, Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious 
about Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 S. METH. UNIV. L. 
REV. 455, 464 (1999) (“anti-deferral provisions can be readily circumvented”).  For a 
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been restricted to passive income items, so that deferral is still available in 
the case of active income (residual taxation of which the U.S. might forego, 
under the foreign tax credit, if foreign taxes are in fact imposed). 
Nevertheless, the concept of residence-based jurisdiction is the default 
system of most developed countries, and the protection of residence-based 
taxation was (and is) therefore given as a reason—perhaps the primary 
reason—for entering into tax treaties. The OECD Model, as the baseline for 
the majority of the world’s tax treaties, thus represents an international 
consensus that the appropriate jurisdiction to tax income arising from cross-
border activity is primarily that based on residence.68  However, there are 
several limitations to the reach of this consensus. 
C. Limitations on Use of Treaties as International Tax Law 
1. Limited Coverage, Scope, and Uniformity 
Not all countries have tax treaties, and no country has tax treaties with 
all the other countries of the world.  The average individual tax treaty 
network comprises just 17 treaty partners, and over half of all countries 
have tax treaty networks of five or fewer treaty partners.69  In addition, the 
benefits of treaties are often limited to activities conducted between the two 
signatory countries.70  As a result, there would have to be over 32,000 
bilateral tax treaties to cover every possible cross-border transaction.71  The 
U.S. would have to enter into new treaties with over 190 countries to ensure 
                                                                                                                            
discussion of the deferral privilege and its inconsistency with U.S. international tax 
principles including the norm of capital export neutrality, see Peroni (1997), supra note 65. 
68 Avi-Yonah (1996), supra note 25, at 1303 (stating that a “coherent international tax 
regime exists that enjoys nearly universal support”); Reuven Avi Yonah, International 
Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507 (1999) (arguing that the worldwide 
network of tax treaties constitutes an international tax regime with definable, common 
principles). 
69 About 30% of countries have no tax treaties in force.  For the 35 countries 
considered by the U.S to be developed, the average network is about 49 treaties; for OECD 
countries, the average is 60.  For less developed countries, the average is 8.  Compiled from 
Ernst & Young, supra note 36, and the Tax Analysts Worldwide Tax Treaties database, as 
of February, 2005, available in LexisNexis.   
70 This is almost universally true when the U.S. is a party.  See U.S. Model, Art. 22. 
71 This figure is based on the assumption that there are approximately 255 independent 
nations in the world today—a figure that is an estimate because sovereignty of nations is a 
matter of foreign policy that varies from nation to nation.  (A currently prominent example 
is the case of Taiwan.  See, e.g., Chen Redux: Inside the Rhetoric, There are Hints of a 
Thaw all round, THE ECONOMIST, May 22, 2004, at 37 (discussing China’s tight grip and 
world response); see also WORLD FACTBOOK 2004, supra note 1 (country data on Taiwan, 
at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tw.html.)      
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that its coverage spanned the globe.  At its current average rate of expansion 
of one new treaty per year since its first treaty was signed with France in 
1935, the prospect of completing the U.S. tax treaty network in a timely 
fashion appears slight.72  
In addition, the OECD Model is aimed at only income taxation, to the 
exclusion of other kinds of taxes, such as consumption and trade taxes.73  
Thus the term “double taxation” refers more particularly to double income 
taxation, and the term “relief of double taxation” refers particularly to the 
alleviation of circumstances in which two countries assert income taxation 
on the same item of income. 74  Yet, there are a number of other taxes 
applied on businesses and individuals.  Increasingly prominent throughout 
the world are consumption taxes, and, in developed countries, social 
security and other payroll taxes.  As these taxes increase in application, tax 
treaties may cover a shrinking portion of revenues collected by countries. 
Finally, as contracts forged through negotiation, individual treaties 
deviate to various degrees from the standards set in the OECD Model.75  
 
 
72 Compiled from first entry-in-force dates of all U.S. tax treaties ever in force.   
73 For reasons owing to historical distinctions that may be less clear today, income 
taxes have generally been attended to in tax treaties, while trade taxes are addressed in 
trade agreements.  See generally Paul R. McDaniel, Trade and Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 1621 (2001); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Joel Slemrod, Treating Tax Issues Through 
Trade Regimes, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1683 (2001); and Alvin C. Warren, Income Tax 
Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV.131 (2001). 
74 The OECD Model describes double taxation as “the imposition of comparable taxes 
in two (or more) states on the same taxpayer in respect of the same subject-matter and for 
identical periods.”  OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON 
INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 7 (Jan. 28, 2003). 
75 Even if their language is similar or identical, tax treaties may also vary due to 
differing interpretations under the domestic law of each country, or, in the case of U.S. 
treaties, pursuant to the agreement of the competent authorities.  This is authorized under 
Art. 3, para. 2 of the OECD, US, and UN Models, which states that any term not defined in 
the treaty is defined under the laws of each country as of the time the treaty is applied—i.e., 
“internal law, as periodically amended.”  Postlewaite & Makarski, supra note 40, at 741 
(adding that “[w]hen countries take different approaches to treaty interpretation, serious 
consequences may result, such as double taxation or the avoidance of any taxation.”).  The 
US Model adds, “or the competent authorities agree to a common meaning pursuant to the 
provisions of Article 25 (the Mutual Agreement Procedure).”  Variation among treaties is 
also authorized under Art. 25 of the OECD, US, and UN Models, which states that the 
competent authorities “shall endeavor to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or 
doubts arising as to the interpretation or application” of the treaty, and that the competent 
authorities “may also consult together for the elimination of double taxation in cases not 
provided for” in the treaty.  The US Model adds that the “competent authorities also may 
agree to increases in any specific amounts …to reflect economic or monetary 
developments.”  US Model, Art. 25, para. 4.  Finally, treaties may deviate from the 
international consensus even if they closely follow the model treaties due to periodic 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art20
2005] Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid 19 
 
Treaties among OECD member countries generally adhere to the pattern 
and main provisions of the OECD Model.76  However, treaties between 
developed and less-developed countries often contain non-standard 
provisions.  These provisions generally derive from a third model tax 
convention, first promulgated by the United Nations in 1980 (the UN 
Model).  The UN Model was the product of a series of discussions and 
meetings of an Ad Hoc Group of Experts formed in 196777 to address 
concerns that the OECD Model (and, by association, the US Model) was 
not appropriate for tax treaties involving non-reciprocal cross border 
activity.78 
2. Assumption of Reciprocal Activity 
The US and OECD Models are directed at and work most effectively 
between two nations that export capital and transfer services in roughly 
reciprocal amounts.  When treaty countries export and import capital to 
each other, each acts as a source country to investors from the other.  Under 
these circumstances, tax treaties coordinate taxation without necessarily 
causing an imbalance in revenue allocation between the two countries: 
revenues given up by countries in their “source” role are recouped in their 
                                                                                                                            
updates to the models and commentary thereto.  For example, recent revisions to the OECD 
Model commentary with respect to the definition of a permanent establishment potentially 
broadens the scope of such provisions and may ultimately lead to a revision of Article 5 of 
the OECD Model.  See, e.g., Richard M. Hammer, The Continuing Saga of the PE: Will the 
OECD Ever Get it Right? 33 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 472 (August 13, 2004) (suggesting that 
the current commentary should be revised because it is “murky and ambiguous,” and 
arguing for the incorporation of a clear de minimum rule in the OECD Model itself).   
76 See OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME 
AND ON CAPITAL 10 (Jan. 28, 2003).  However, improvements and advances in 
international business and tax practices contribute to increased deviation even among 
OECD countries.  Recently, so-called “double non-taxation” provisions have been 
introduced in new treaties.  These provisions directly contravene existing OECD 
provisions.  See, e.g., Michael Lang, General Report, in DOUBLE NON-TAXATION, CAHIERS 
DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL vol. 89a (International Fiscal Assoc., 2004), at 77. 
77 The Group of Experts included members from Latin American, North American, 
African, Asian and European countries. The group also had observers from the IMF, the 
International Fiscal Association, the OECD, the Organization of American States, and the 
International Chamber of Commerce.  UNITED NATIONS DEPT. OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN 
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES vii (2001). 
78 See United Nations Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs (2001), supra note 34, at 
viii; Mutén, supra note 284 at 3. 
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“residence” role.79  Consequently, such treaties are expected to have little 
revenue effect on either country.80   
If instead the flow of capital moves primarily from one country to 
another, reciprocity is lost.  One country becomes primarily the source, or  
source country, while the other becomes primarily the residence, or home 
country.  Because LDCs are typically capital importing countries, their 
primary role under tax treaties is as  source country.81  Residence 
jurisdiction will therefore be minimally exercised by LDCs.82  In such 
 
 
79 For example, while the U.S. may give up revenue by refraining from taxing 
dividends paid to foreign persons under a treaty, it recoups the loss by collecting the full 
tax on dividends paid by the foreign country to U.S. residents (without reduction under the 
foreign tax credit provisions, since under the treaty, the foreign country doesn’t tax the 
dividend). 
80 See, e.g., STAFF OF THE SENATE FOREIGN REL. COMM., 105TH CONG., REPORT ON THE 
TAX CONVENTION WITH IRELAND 17 (Comm. Print 1997) (“the proposed treaty is estimated 
to cause a negligible change in … Federal budget receipts”); STAFF OF THE SENATE 
FOREIGN REL. COMM., 108TH CONG., REPORT ON THE TAX CONVENTION WITH THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 16, 17 (Comm. Print 2003) (same). The balance apparently holds even in the 
case of complete exemption of source-country taxation. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT 
COMM ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED PROTOCOL TO THE 
INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA (Comm. Print 2003) 
(suggesting that the new zero-rate for tax on direct dividends would provide “immediate 
and direct benefits to the United States as both an importer and an exporter of capital,” and 
that “[t]he overall revenue impact of this provision is unclear, as the direct revenue loss to 
the United States as a source country would be offset in whole or in part by a revenue gain 
as a residence country from reduced foreign tax credit claims with respect to Australian 
taxes.”). 
81 The flow of capital between the U.S. and an LDC typically originates from the 
former and flows to the latter, although this is less true with respect to the “advanced 
developing” countries, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Brazil.  See, e.g., 
Yoram Margalioth, Tax Competition, Foreign Direct Investments and Growth: Using The 
Tax System to Promote Developing Countries, 23 VA. TAX REV. 161, 198 (2003) (LDCs 
are generally not typical destinations for portfolio investment); see also Statement of Leslie 
B. Samuels, supra note 5 (capital flows are typically nonreciprocal between the U.S. and 
LDCs).  Most multinationals are resident of developed countries.  Of the top 100 
multinational companies (as measured by foreign assets), just five are resident in LDCs 
(Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, and Venezuela).  UNCTAD, The Top 100 TNCs, 
Ranked By Foreign Assets, 2000, 01/09/02 (WIR/2002/TNCs), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2443&lang=1.  Of the top fifty 
multinational companies from developing economies, none are based in the LDCs of Sub-
Saharan Africa.  UNCTAD, The Top 50 TNCs from developing economies, ranked by 
foreign assets, 2000, 01/09/02 (WIR/2002/TNCs), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2443&lang=1. 
82 It may be minimally exercised even in the absence of treaties, since few LDCs in 
Sub-Saharan Africa assert worldwide taxation on their residents.  Among the exceptions 
are Angola, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda.  
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cases, a tax treaty shifts tax revenues inversely to the flow of capital.  As a 
result, LDCs may contract their taxing jurisdiction under tax treaties 
without realizing any benefit from the corresponding contraction by the 
partner country. 
Non-reciprocal contraction by the LDC occurs in the context of 
portfolio investment as its role as the source country requires it to reduce its 
tax rates on dividends, interest, and royalties, while the residence country 
preserves the right to impose full taxation on these items.  Non-reciprocal 
contraction also occurs in the context of active business income, as 
threshold rules for taxing business income prevent source-country taxation 
of certain activities, such as storing and displaying goods or building and 
construction activities.83  These threshold rules are embodied in the concept 
of the “permanent establishment.”   
The permanent establishment rules are found in Article 5 of each of the 
US, OECD, and UN model treaties.  Under these rules, the source country 
agrees to refrain from taxing business income  unless it is attributable to 
business activities that meet physical presence requirements, and even then, 
in some cases, only if the activities are conducted for a given duration or 
rise to a substantial enough level.  Accordingly, under the US and OECD 
Models, a permanent establishment is generally deemed to exist and 
therefore create taxing jurisdiction if business activities are conducted 
through a fixed place of business and consist of more than “peripheral or 
ancillary activities,” but certain activities such as building and construction 
must last more than a year.84   
Responding to the non-reciprocal aspects of relationships between 
developed and less developed countries, the UN Group of Experts sought to 
preserve source country taxation in tax treaties in its Model.  Thus, the UN 
Model provides for lower thresholds by shortening the duration and 
including certain activities not included in the OECD and US Models.85 For 
                                                                                                                            
Ernst & Young, supra note 36.  Ghana, the subject of the case study presented in Part III of 
this Article, generally exercises territorial taxation but imposes tax on certain repatriated 
earnings.  See Republic of Ghana, Internal Revenue Act of 2000 (G.I.R.A.) § 6 (residents’ 
assessable income includes that “accruing in, derived from, brought into, or received in 
Ghana”). 
83 See US, OECD, and UN Models, Art. 5.   
84 See US Models, Art. 5, Sec. 3.  Peripheral and ancillary activities include 
exploratory or preparatory functions such as research and development, as well as activities 
considered incidental to the economic source of the income, such as storage, display, or 
delivery of goods.  The US Model is virtually identical to the OECD Model. 
85 It otherwise adheres in large part to the OECD Model, and the two have become 
closer.  Indeed, the relevance of the UN Model has diminished significantly and it may be 
seen as irrelevant to the extent developed countries agree to higher source-based tax in their 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
22  [Vol. 154:XX 
  
 
example, under the UN Model, a permanent establishment may arise after a 
duration of as low as six months for certain activities,86 fewer ancillary 
activities are excluded,87  and more income is attributed to permanent 
establishments via a force of attraction rule.88  Nevertheless the UN Model 
limits source-country taxation in its use of the permanent establishment 
concept: in the absence of the treaty, the source country would typically 
provide little or no threshold to taxation.89 
In addition, the UN Group of Experts determined that in treaties 
between developed and less developed countries, higher source-based 
taxation of passive items would be appropriate.  Just how high, however, 
has not been determined.  While the OECD Model provides recommended 
maximum source country tax rates for dividends (5 and 15%, for direct and 
regular dividends, respectively), interest (10%), and royalties (zero),90 and 
                                                                                                                            
tax treaties, which they have done to a significant extent.  See, e.g., John F. Avery Jones, 
Are Tax Treaties Necessary? 53 TAX L. REV. 1, 2 (1999) ( “there seems to be little need for 
a separate model for developing countries”). 
86 UN Model, Art. 5, para. 3.  In paragraph 3(a), building and construction activities 
and related supervisory activities are a permanent establishment if they last more than six 
contiguous months; in paragraph 3(b), consulting services are a permanent establishment if 
such services continue for a cumulative (even if non-contiguous) six months.  In the OECD 
model, building and construction activities must continue for more than twelve months to 
constitute a permanent establishment, related supervisory activities are not included, and 
there is no parallel provision regarding consulting services.  For a comparison of the OECD 
and UN Model permanent establishment provisions, see Bart Kosters, The UN Model 
Convention and Its Recent Developments, ASIA-PACIFIC TAX BULLETIN January/February 
2004, at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/other/unpan014878.pdf.   
87 For example, in the OECD and US Models, the use of facilities or maintenance of a 
stock of goods for delivery is specifically excluded from the definition of permanent 
establishment, while in the UN Model it is not.  Compare US and OECD models, Art. 5 
para. 4 and UN Model Art. 5, para. 4. 
88 The OECD and US Models provides source-country taxation only of profits that are 
attributable to the permanent establishment.  The UN Model includes profits attributable to 
the sale of the same or similar goods or merchandise as those sold through the permanent 
establishment and profits from the same or similar business activities as those conducted 
through the permanent establishment.  Compare US and OECD models, Art. 7 para. 1 and 
UN Model Art. 7, para. 1. 
89 For an argument that thresholds are appropriate, should be used even in the absence 
of a treaty, and should be made more uniform (in the current models, there are different 
thresholds for different activities), see Brian J. Arnold, Threshold Requirements for Taxing 
Business Profits Under Tax Treaties, in THE TAXATION OF BUSINESS PROFITS UNDER TAX 
TREATIES 55 (Brian J. Arnold, Jacques Sasseville, and Eric M. Zolt, eds. 2003).  The 
permanent establishment concept has been revised and updated to adapt to changes in 
business and technology over the years, but remains consistent with the original version 
introduced in the first OECD Model (1963). 
90  See OECD Model, Art, 10, 11, and 12, respectively. 
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the US Model looks virtually identical (but provides zero source-country 
taxation of interest), the UN Model leaves the source country taxation of 
these items to be established through bilateral negotiations.  The UN Model 
thus implies that higher tax rates are appropriate in tax treaties with LDCs, 
but declines to recommend exactly what rate is appropriate.91   
 The UN Model provisions and concepts have been used frequently in 
U.S. tax treaties with developed as well as less developed countries over the 
years.92  For example, the U.S. income tax treaties with the Barbados, 
Canada, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, 
Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, the Ukraine, and Venezuela, each provide for 
lower permanent establishment duration requirements, narrower definitions 
of ancillary and preparatory activities, higher source-country tax rates on 
passive income items, or a combination of these features.   
The consequence of preserving source-country taxation to overcome 
non-reciprocal capital flows, however, is that it undermines the relief of 
double taxation ostensibly sought as the primary purpose for entering into 
the treaty in the first place.  This has been a problematic area, for it appears 
to drafters and negotiators of tax treaties and treaty models to be 
indeterminable whether it is better for LDCs to preserve source-country 
taxation so as to collect the maximum amount of revenues, or to relieve 
source-country taxation so as to attract the maximum amount of foreign 
investment.  Tsilly Dagan eloquently illustrated the conundrum and 
presented a game theory rationale that explains why many LDCs have opted 
for the latter.93  As discussed in Part III, this choice is one of the main 
reasons tax treaties have become obsolete for many investors in LDCs, yet 
new U.S. tax treaties with LDCs continue to be sought, and, when 
concluded, they continue to provide for higher source-country taxes on 
passive income items, even when the treaty rate exceeds that of the internal 
laws of the LDC.94 
The importance of reciprocity as requisite to make a tax treaty 
appropriate is demonstrated in the current composition of the U.S. tax treaty 
network.  Like all developed countries, reciprocal trade and investment 
partners are covered by tax treaties: the U.S. has them in place with all of its 
major trading partners95 and the bulk of its foreign direct investment sources 
 
 
91 See Arts. 10, 11, and 12 in each model.      
92 Kosters, supra note 86, at 9.   
93  See supra, note 41.   
94 See discussion infra at note 134. 
95 Major trade partners include Canada, China, Germany, Japan, Mexico and the UK.  
World Factbook (2004), supra note 1.  The most glaring exception in the U.S. tax treaty 
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and destinations.96  Yet, with just 55 comprehensive tax treaties covering 62 
countries, the U.S. network is comparatively small relative to the other 
major economics of the world,97 and it excludes more than 20% of U.S. 
foreign direct investment.98  Moreover, just 16 U.S. tax treaties are with 
LDCs, 99 as compared with an average of 22 in other leading economies.100  
To the extent that tax treaties influence the flow of trade and investment 
between the U.S. and the rest of the world, they may impact U.S. foreign 
investment, trade, and aid efforts to LDCs.  The following Part explores 
whether more complete U.S. tax treaty coverage could impact these flows 
by considering a hypothetical tax treaty with Ghana, an LDC in Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
III. U.S. TAX TREATIES WITH LDCS: CASE STUDY OF GHANA 
This Part presents as a case study a hypothetical tax treaty based on 
current U.S. tax treaty standards with respect to LDCs.  The case study 
demonstrates that the lack of tax treaties between the U.S. and the LDCs of 
Sub-Saharan Africa may be explained in large part by the fact that in 
today’s global tax climate, these agreements would not significantly impact 
the global tax burden currently faced by current or potential international 
investors.  As a result, even if governments commit to concluding them, and 
even with support from academics, practitioners, and lawmakers, tax 
                                                                                                                            
network is probably Brazil, with whom negotiations have been stalled since 1992.  See 
infra, note 302. 
96 The tax treaty network currently covers approximately 78% of U.S. foreign direct 
investment, as valued at historical cost (book value of U.S. direct investors’ equity in and 
net outstanding loans to foreign affiliates).  See Maria Borga & Daniel R. Yorgason, Direct 
Investment Positions for 2003: Country and Industry Detail 40, 49 (July, 2004), available 
at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/ARTICLES/2004/07July/0704dip.pdf 
97 In contrast, the U.K. and France each have tax treaties with over 100 countries; 
Canada and the Netherlands with over 80.  Ernst & Young, supra note 36, at 129, 250, 612, 
938.   
98 See supra, note 69. 
99 See supra, note 4.  When the tax treaty with Sri Lanka (signed in 1985) entered into 
force in July of 2004, it was the first new country added to the tax treaty network since the 
treaty with Slovenia entered into force in 2001, and the first new LDC since Venezuela was 
added in 1999. 
100 17 of the 30 OECD countries have larger LDCs tax treaty networks.  For example, 
the U.K. and France each have tax treaties with 60 LDCs, Canada has 40, Germany has 36, 
Norway has 35, and Italy and Sweden each have 32.  Compiled from Ernst & Young, supra 
note 36, and the Tax Analysts Worldwide Tax Treaties database, as of February, 2005, 
available in LexisNexis.   
100 See US Model, Art. 22. 
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treaties between the U.S. and the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa would 
nevertheless be largely ineffective in stimulating cross-border investment 
and trade.  Section A introduces Ghana as the subject of the case study.  
Section B outlines the framework of a hypothetical tax treaty between the 
U.S. and Ghana.   Section C discusses the probable impact of the 
hypothetical tax treaty on the flow of  investment and trade between the two 
countries, and demonstrates that the tax treaty is unlikely to produce 
significant increases in investment and trade from the U.S. to Ghana. 
 
A. Ghana as the Subject of a Case Study 
The pursuit of a tax treaty with Ghana, a nation of 20 million people in 
West Africa, would support current U.S. commercial and non-commercial 
interests in this country.  Non-commercial interests of the U.S. in Ghana 
include longstanding diplomatic ties101 and an interest in fostering economic 
stability in this region of the world for humanitarian reasons, as well as a 
recognition that conditions of extreme poverty like those found in Ghana 
are a potential breeding ground for terrorism.102   
U.S commercial interests in Ghana include both trade and investment 
relationships.  Several of the largest foreign investments in Ghana are 
owned by U.S. companies,103 and U.S. companies continue to express an 
interest in pursuing business opportunities in this country.104  U.S. 
 
 
101 See U.S. Department of State, Background Note—Ghana, available at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2860.htm ( “The United States has enjoyed good relations 
with Ghana at the nonofficial, personal level since Ghana’s independence. Thousands of 
Ghanaians have been educated in the United States. Close relations are maintained between 
educational and scientific institutions, and cultural links, particularly between Ghanaians 
and African-Americans, are strong.”) 
102 Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, allegedly linked to the 
international terrorist organization of al Qaeda, provide perhaps the most illustrative reason 
for U.S. interests in brokering peace and stability in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The U.S. also has 
interests in Sub-Saharan Africa for social justice reasons, including the extreme poverty 
faced by a majority of the population in this region.  For a discussion of the importance of 
pursuing tax treaties in response to these issues, see Brown, supra note 7, at 61. 
103 These include the Volta Aluminum Company, Ltd (Valco), a Ghanaian aluminum 
manufacturing company that is jointly owned by Kaiser Aluminum Corp (a Texas 
corporation owning 90%) and Alcoa Inc., (a Pennsylvania corporation owning 10%);   
Regimanuel Gray, a construction company jointly owned by Regimanuel Ltd. (a Ghanaian 
company) and Gray Construction (a Texas corporation);   and Equatorial Bottlers, a 
bottling company wholly owned by the Coca Cola Company (a Delaware corporation).    
104 See, e.g., Newmont to start up in Ghana, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney, 
Australia), December 22, 2003, Pg. 59 (discussing the purchase by Newmont Mining Corp, 
a Delaware Corporation, of the Ahafo gold mine in Ghana); Elinor Arbel, AMR, Pier 1 
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investment in and trade with Ghana is facilitated because, as a former 
colony of the U.K.,105 Ghana’s official language is English,106 its laws are a 
blend of customary law and English common law, and its regulatory state 
derives much from the British system, thus providing a familiar framework 
for commercial relations.107 
U.S. trade and aid initiatives specifically identify Ghana as regionally 
significant to U.S. trade interests due to its central location in an 
international business corridor that stretches from Nigeria to Côte 
d’Ivoire.108  As is the case for most LDCs,109 the U.S. is one of Ghana’s 
                                                                                                                            
Imports, Sun Microsystems: U.S. Equity Movers Final, BLOOMBERG NEWS, August 16, 
2004, (discussing plans by Alcoa Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, to buy and restart an 
aluminum smelter in Ghana); and G. Pascal Zachary, Searching for a Dial Tone in Africa, 
THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 5, 2003, sec. C., p. 1, col. 2 (quoting a former senior executive 
of Microsoft who surveyed Ghana as a potential regional hub for an information-
technology industry, who stated that Ghana “has the potential to become for Africa what 
Bangalore became for India,” and discussing Rising Data Solutions, a Maryland 
corporation that recently introduced a call center in Ghana and Affiliated Computer 
Services, a Dallas company that began doing business in Ghana in 2001 and is looking to 
expand its operations).  
105 Seventeen LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa are former colonies of the U.K.: Botswana, 
The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; all but 
Somalia and Tanzania designate English as their official language; an additional four 
countries list English among their official languages.  See World Factbook (2004), supra 
note 1. 
106 The use of English may be an important factor for the foreign investment location 
decisions of U.S. Multinational firms.  See Kravis & Lipsey, The Location of Overseas 
Production and Production for Export by US Multinational Firms, NBER Working Paper 
No. W0482 (August 1982), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=262704. 
107 U.S. Multinational companies may prefer to invest in countries with which they 
have “economic, political, language, or cultural ties.”  John H. Dunning, THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF BUSINESS 41 (1993) (discussing “geographical clustering” of 
multinational companies). 
108 2003 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-
Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act 5 (May 
2003).  Ghana is also poised to be the financial hub of a West African monetary zone 
(WAMZ) that is expected to be established in July, 2005.  See, e.g., Hon. Yaw Osafo-
Maafo, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, The Budget Statement and Economic 
Policy of the Government of Ghana for the 2004 Financial Year (February, 2004), para. 43.   
When established, the WAMZ will facilitate commerce in the region by introducing a 
single currency (the ECO) in the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), which includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, the Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and 
Togo.  For information on ECOWAS, see the organization’s website at 
http://www.sec.ecowas.int/. 
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principal trading partners, although U.S. goods comprise a small portion of 
Ghana’s total imports.110  As a result, like most of the LDCs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Ghana is a relatively untapped market for U.S. exports.111  
Current trends in U.S. trade and investment interests in Ghana support 
the notion that increasing investment in this country is a viable goal, and 
that the goal is being met by current efforts in executing international 
agreements.  For example, U.S. trade with Ghana increased following the 
enactment and implementation of AGOA.112  Nevertheless, U.S. investment 
in Ghana remains relatively slight, by global standards.113  Low levels of 
investment in Ghana may be explained by a number of factors including 
several non-tax barriers to investment. Ghana’s low level of infrastructure 
has been blamed as a major impediment to increased investment.114   
                                                                                                                            
109 The U.S. is a principal export partner to 65% of LDCs, and a principal import 
partner to 62%.  Compiled from WORLD FACTBOOK 2004, supra note 1. 
110 See U.S. Department of State, Ghana Country Commercial Guide FY2002, 
available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-ri.nsf/en/gr109073e.html (stating 
that “in the past, Ghana conducted most of its external trade with Europe, but trade with the 
United States is becoming increasingly significant”). Ghana’s import market is currently 
dominated by Nigeria (contributing 21% of all imports), followed by the U.K. with 7.2%.  
Along with the U.S., China, Italy, and Côte d’Ivoire each contribute approximately 6% of 
total imports.  In comparison, the U.S. is currently a principal exporter to 20 other LDCs in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, contributing over 50% of imports in Namibia, about 30% in Chad and 
Equatorial Guinea, and about 15% in Eritrea and Angola.  World Factbook (2004), supra 
note 1.   
111 As a potential export market, Ghana and other LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa are also 
important to the U.S. labor market.  See John Cochran, Bush Visits Africa — But Why 
Now?, ABC NEWS REPORT (July 8, 2003), available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/World/africa030708_bush.html (over 100,000 U.S. 
jobs depend on exports to Africa). 
112 Since 2000, when AGOA was first implemented, U.S. exports to Ghana have 
grown steadily but imports from Ghana have decreased.  United States International Trade 
Commission, U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa, available at 
http://reportweb.usitc.gov/Africa/trade_balance.jsp. 
113 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 14 (2003) (hereinafter, “WIR 2003”), at 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1465&lang=1. 
114 See US. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, GHANA COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE FY2002, 
Ch. 7, Part A.1. (stating that infrastructure shortcomings have impeded domestic 
productivity and discouraged foreign direct investment), at 
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-ri.nsf/en/gr109073e.html.  Along with the rest of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, which experienced a large and continuing decline in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in tandem with the global financial crisis of the late 1990s, Ghana’s share 
of global foreign investment has dropped significantly over the past few years, and it 
considered an underperformer with respect to its foreign direct investment potential.  Its 
40% decline in FDI from 2001 to 2002 mirrors the experience of the continent, to which 
FDI declined as a whole from $19 billion in 2001 to $11 billion in 2002 (a 41% decline).  
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Examples of Ghana’s infrastructural shortcomings include obvious 
physical burdens such as poorly maintained roads,115 interruptions in 
electricity,116 a lack of clean water,117 and a paucity of institutions such as 
schools and hospitals.118  Equally problematic are Ghana’s excessive 
administrative requirements and bottlenecks as well as other barriers to the 
entry and operation of business by foreign persons.119  For example, Ghana 
continues to struggle with land and property protection,120 restricts foreign 
                                                                                                                            
These declines are sharp when compared to that for global FDI, which declined as a whole 
by 21% in the same period.  See WIR 2003, supra note 113 at 3, 14. 
115 As John Torgbenu, a taxi driver in Accra, describes the multitude of certifications 
needed to obtain a cab license in Ghana: “the cars must be road-worthy, but the roads need 
not be car-worthy.”  See also Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies of the 
Government of Ghana for 2003-05, March 31, 2003 (MEFP) at para. 8 (“Ghana’s basic 
infrastructure continues to remain in very poor shape.  The building of roads, ports, and 
communication networks…have been driving forces behind the government’s efforts to 
secure a predictable flow of external financing for infrastructure development”). 
116 Despite the presence of West Africa’s largest hydro-electric plants at Volta Lake in 
northern Ghana, electricity outages are such a frequent phenomenon that individuals, 
businesses and institutions that can afford generators have them, and put them to use on a 
regular basis.  Fueling the modernization process is one of the key developments sought in 
connection with Ghana’s requests for IMF funding.  See MFEP (2003), supra note 115. 
117 Ghana is among the majority of LDCs in the world that have not developed an 
improved water supply.  See statistics and information gathered by the World Health 
Organization, at http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/hygiene/en/. 
118 Low levels of education, literacy, and health care issues are among the institutional 
issues Ghana faces.  See, e.g., George Gyan-Baffour, The Ghana Poverty Reduction 
Strategy: Poverty Diagnostics and Components of the Strategy, at 
http://www.casmsite.org/Documents/Elmina%202003%20-%20Workshop%20-
%20Poverty%20Reduction%20-%203.pdf. 
119 Much of these administrative regimes are a lasting legacy of colonization, under 
which the European nations imposed severe market controls to preserve the resources of 
their colonies for their exclusive use.  See, e.g., FRANCIS AGBODEKA, AN ECONOMIC 
HISTORY OF GHANA 7 – 21 (1992).  For an overview of ease of entry issues for LDCs 
generally, see JEFFREY C. HOOKE, EMERGING MARKETS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR 
CORPORATIONS, LENDERS, AND INVESTORS (2001), (discussing the entrenched obstacles to 
entry in LDCs); see also Leora Klapper, Luc Laeven & Raghuram Rajan, Business 
Environment and Firm Entry: Evidence from International Data, NBER Working Paper 
No. 10380 (2004), at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10380.pdf (finding that bureaucratic 
entry regulations are a significant burden that hampers the entry of firms into foreign 
markets). 
120 Courts in Ghana are overwhelmed with land disputes.  Interview with Kwame 
Gyan, Law Professor, University of Ghana-Legon, December, 2003 (notes on file with the 
author.  
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ownership of real property,121 and has only recently dismantled regulations 
that closed several industries to foreign investors all together.122   
Ghana’s current administration has pledged to make significant 
improvements to its infrastructure, as part of its approach to poverty 
reduction and economic growth through the building of a business-friendly 
environment.123  The reduction of administrative obstacles, combined with 
greater certainty with regard to the legal and regulatory regime, is credited 
with a recent surge in foreign investment from South Africa to other 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.124  It is hoped that this surge will be 
followed by increased investment from other countries, including the U.S. 
An increased share of foreign investment is also expected to lead to 
spillover effects that would remedy some of the current deficiencies in 
physical infrastructure.   Limited spillover effects have been achieved 
recently in connection with Ghana’s gold mining operations, which have 
provided funding to improve transportation routes.125  Similarly, in Nigeria, 
 
 
121 The inability to own land translates to an inability to use land as collateral for 
financial transactions, which is a key to economic growth.  See Enrique Gelbard, 
Measuring Financial Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 18, IMF Working Paper # 
99/105 (1999), at http://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/99105.html. 
122 See WIR 2003, supra note 113 at 36. 
123 Hon. Yaw Osafo-Maafo, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, The Budget 
Statement and Economic Policy of the Government of Ghana for the 2003 Financial Year  
(November, 2003), para. 22 (pledging the government’s “commitment to deliver a macro-
economic environment that underpins our strategy for growth and poverty reduction”); 
Hon. Yaw Osafo-Maafo (2004), supra note 108, at para. 4 (pledging to continue to “create 
an enabling environment for wealth creation).  See also various documentation in 
connection with IMF lending, including the MFEP (2003), supra note 115.  
124 Nicole Itano, South African Companies Fill a Void, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 4, 
2003, at Section W; P. 1, Col. 3 (“It’s safer to go in, it’s easier to get materials in and out, 
easier to repatriate your profits,” according to Keith Campbell, a managing director of a 
South African risk management firm, and vice-chairman of the South Africa-Angola 
Chamber of Commerce).  The overhaul of economies has often been initiated by the 
international lending organizations, which have faced much criticism and been the subject 
of much debate in the face of the apparent failure of many of their reform efforts.  
However, the extreme opposite approach, as unfortunately presented in the case of 
Zimbabwe, illustrates the need for some fundamental certainty in dealing with foreign 
businesses in order to attract foreign investment and maintain a stable economy.  
125 Ghana’s gold mines have recently sparked interest from foreign investors, who will 
spend millions of dollars to upgrade and develop operations following years of neglect and 
under-maintenance of these operations, because they expect productivity to increase 
dramatically and produce significant profit as a result.  See Mr. Jonah goes to Jo’burg, 
ECONOMIST, January 15, 2004 (AngloGold (South Africa) expects to spend between $250 
and $500 million to upgrade its newly acquired Ghanaian gold mine (Ashanti Goldfields)); 
Newmont to go for Ghana Gold, THE ADVERTISER, Monday, December 22, 2003, Finance 
section, p. 50. (Newmont (U.S.) plans to spend about $350 million to develop its recently-
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one of Ghana’s close neighbors, investors in the telecommunications 
industry funded the installation of communication networks throughout the 
country.126  Ghana’s growing telecommunications industry may draw like 
commitments from future investors.127  However, the components of 
infrastructure that are not produced by spillover, such as the legal and 
regulatory framework that protects businesses and creates an environment 
for growth, must generally be directly supported and funded by the 
government.128   
Despite the infrastructural obstacles present in Ghana, U.S. investment 
in this country continues to grow, albeit slowly.  The following section 
explores whether and how such investment might be affected by a tax treaty 
between the two countries. 
B. Structure of a Tax Treaty between Ghana and the U.S. 
As discussed in Part I, the US Model serves as the template for all new 
tax treaties negotiated by Treasury, though the OECD Model and other 
recent treaties are also consulted.  Thus, in structure and overall content, a 
tax treaty between the U.S. and Ghana would emulate the model treaties, 
especially the US Model, to a substantial degree.  However, in negotiations 
                                                                                                                            
acquired Ghanaian gold mine (Ahafo)).  See also Big-game Hunting, ECONOMIST, August 
13, 2004; Gargi Chakrabarty, Newmont OKs Project in Ghana; Gold Producer Invests 
$350 Million in W. African Mine, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, CO), December 19, 
2003; and Gargi Chakrabarty, Latest Global Hot Spot For Gold Mining: Ghana,  ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver, CO), October 30, 2003, page 1B. 
126 South Africa’s Vodacom recently spent $119 million building a cellular network in 
the Congo, a critically impoverished country that has only recently emerged from 
devastating civil war.  South Africa’s  MTN Group spent approximately 1.75 billion 
building cellular networks in five different Sub-Saharan Africa countries ($900 million in 
Nigeria alone), and experiences a 40% profit margin in these markets—despite having to 
build power generators to overcome a lack of stable power sources and a transmission 
network to connect cities and towns across the country—compared to its 30% return at 
home in South Africa.  Nicole Itano, South African Companies Fill a Void, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, at Section W; P. 1, Col. 3.       
127 See supra, note 104. 
128 Coercion of various forms may induce companies to provide such infrastructure in 
the absence of voluntary action.  For example, in 2003, foreign workers were kidnapped in 
Nigeria, in an effort to extract a promise from a foreign company to build a school and a 
health center.  See Nigeria’s oil-rich area mired in poverty, THE DAILY GRAPHIC (Ghana), 
December 3, 2003, at p. 5.   Clearly no government should be encouraged to rely on these 
kinds of tactics to build adequate infrastructure, but the fact that citizens of a nation are 
willing to engage in illegal acts to secure public goods illustrates the tensions and pressures 
facing both international businesses and the governments struggling to attract such 
businesses.  
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with LDCs, Treasury also consults the UN Model.129  As a result, these 
treaties usually contain several standard deviations from the US Model, 
described in reports and technical explanations as “developing-country 
concessions.”130  They are called concessions because they typically 
concede U.S. residence-based taxing jurisdiction in favor of greater source-
country taxation.131   
An example of a U.S. treaty with an LDC, as compared to the US Model 
Treaty, demonstrates the operation of these concessions.  At the time it was 
entered into, the U.S. tax treaty with Jamaica was deemed the “model U.S. 
treaty for developing countries.”132  At 24 years of age, that treaty is 
substantially out of date, as many tax laws in the U.S. (and presumably in 
 
 
129 See supra, text at note 60, and see, e.g., Department of the Treasury Technical 
Explanation of the Convention Between The Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka for the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income 
Signed at Colombo March 14, 1985, As Amended by a Protocol Signed at Washington on 
September 20, 2002 (“Negotiations also took into account the [OECD Model], the [UN 
Model], and recent tax treaties concluded by both countries.) 
130 This designation has been consistently propounded throughout U.S. tax treaty 
history, and continues virtually unchanged today. For example, compare reports prepared 
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Joint Committee on Taxation in 
connection with the tax treaties with India (1977), the Philippines (1989), and Sri Lanka 
(2004).  See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 95th CONG.,  EXPLANATION OF 
PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA (Comm. Print 
1977) (“The proposed treaty contains a number of developing country 
concessions…providing for relatively broad source-basis taxation”); STAFF OF THE SENATE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., REPORT ON THE TAX CONVENTION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF 
INDIA (1989); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG.,  EXPLANATION OF 
PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA 3, 64 (Comm. Print 2004) (hereinafter, “EXPLANATION 
OF SRI LANKA TREATY”) (describing these deviations as substantive, and outlining the 
major provisions). 
131 Id at 64.  To the extent that source-based taxing jurisdiction is theoretically more 
justifiable, the term concession is something of a misnomer.  See discussion in Part II, 
Section B.   Nevertheless, as much source-based jurisdiction has been ceded in favor of 
residence-based jurisdiction in the evolution of the model treaties, a reversal of this norm, 
especially in the case of non-reciprocal capital flows, can in theory shift greater tax revenue 
collection to the country of source.  By so doing, it requires the residence-country to revert 
to the role of relieving double taxation via the generosity of the foreign tax credit, 
discussed supra, text at note 44.  However, the theory that revenues are  conceded under 
these provisions only holds if the source country actually imposes and collects the tax.  
This is an assumption which cannot be relied upon in today’s global economy, as discussed 
infra. 
132 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF JAMAICA 
TREATY (Comm. Print 1981).   
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Jamaica) have changed significantly since it entered into force in 1981.133  
However, the principles of enlarging source-country taxation found in the 
Jamaica-U.S. treaty continue to appear in new tax treaties with other 
LDCs.134  Therefore, the following discussion uses the Jamaica-U.S. treaty 
to model what a Ghana-U.S. tax treaty might look like, if concluded on the 
basis of precedent. 
In the U.S. tax treaty with Jamaica, as in most tax treaties with LDCs, 
the expectation that non-reciprocal capital flows may negatively impact the 
LDC is addressed by preserving source-country taxation.  This is mainly 
accomplished through modifications to the articles dealing with the 
determination of thresholds for taxing income from business activities (the 
permanent establishment provision)  and those dealing with the taxation of 
passive-type income (dividends, interest, and royalties provisions).135   
First, under the permanent establishment concept, source-country 
taxation is enlarged by expanding the definition to allow the LDC to impose 
taxation on more of the business profits earned by foreign persons in the 
source country.  Thus, in the Jamaica-U.S. treaty, the permanent 
establishment provision mirrors the structure of the U.S. and OECD 
Models, but incorporates the UN Model approach, shortening the threshold 
durational requirement from one year to six months in the case of 
construction, dredging, drilling, and similar activities.136  It also provides 
that the furnishing of services can create a permanent establishment if 
continued for more than 90 days a year.137  Finally, it provides that 
maintaining substantial equipment or machinery in a country for 4 months 
 
 
133 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, May 21, 1980, U.S.-Jam., T.I.A.S. No. 10207, 
1982-1 C.B. 257 (entered into force on December 29, 1981). 
134 Evidently in some cases, this is done regardless of the pre-existing legal framework 
in the LDC.  See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX., 108TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF SRI 
LANKA TREATY, supra note 130, at 62 (stating that “it is not clear that …Sri Lankan laws 
have been fully taken into account” since “[s]everal of the articles of the proposed treaty 
contain provisions that are less favorable to taxpayers than the corresponding rules of the 
internal Sri Lankan tax laws”). 
135 See supra, Part II. Section C. 
136 U.S.-Jamaica, Art. 5, para. 2(i).  The activity must continue for “more than 183 
days in any 12-month period,” and at least 30 days in any given taxable year to constitute a 
permanent establishment. 
137 U.S.-Jamaica, Art. 5, para 2(j).  The services must continue for “more than 90 days 
in any 12-month period” and at least 30 days in any given taxable year to constitute a 
permanent establishment. 
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can constitute a permanent establishment.138  One or more of these 
deviations from the US Model are found in most U.S. tax treaties with 
LDCs.139  Consequently, similar provisions would likely be suggested, 
negotiated and agreed to in a Ghana-U.S. tax treaty. 
Under the passive income provisions, source-country taxation is 
enlarged by allowing source-country to impose tax rates on these items of 
income in excess of the maximum rates provided in the US Model.  The US 
Model allows source country tax rates of no more than 5% on “direct 
dividends” (those paid to corporate shareholders holding at least 10% of the 
paying company’s stock), 15% on “regular dividends” (all other 
shareholders), and zero on interest and royalties.140  In contrast, the 
Jamaica-U.S. treaty provides for source-country tax rates of 10% on direct 
dividends,141 15% on regular dividends,142 12.5% on interest,143 and 10% on 
royalties.144 
Despite the general trend of higher source-country taxation of passive 
income items in U.S. tax treaties with LDCs, source-country taxation of 
certain items of passive income have recently been lowered in a number of 
 
 
138 U.S.-Jamaica, Art. 5, para 2(k).  The equipment or machinery must be maintained 
“for a period of more than 120 consecutive days,” and at least 30 days in any given taxable 
year to constitute a permanent establishment. 
139 See, e.g., India-U.S., art. 5, para. (j), (k), and (l) (providing for the same 
concessions as in the Jamaica-U.S. treaty).  Similar deviations are also in U.S. tax treaties 
with other developed countries.  See, e.g., Canada-U.S., art. 5, para 4 (providing that the 
use of a drilling rig or ship for more than 3 months in any twelve-month period constitutes 
a permanent establishment).  Since Canada is a developed country, the Senate Report does 
not mention the UN Model as a source of consultation, and the Joint Committee does not 
identify the deviation as a concession by the U.S., but rather explains that “[t]he shorter 
period was included in the treaty at the insistence of Canada which felt that a one-year 
period was unrealistic, given the adverse conditions of drilling in the Canadian offshore 
and the fact that the drilling season there is very short.”  See STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. 
ON FOR. REL, 96th Cong. (Comm. Print 1980); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 
96TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF TAX CONVENTION WITH CANADA (Comm. Print 1980).  
Narrow thresholds continue to appear in newly-signed U.S. tax treaties, such as the one 
with Bangladesh.  See supra note 43, at art. 5, para. 3 and 6 (not yet in force). 
140 US Model Arts. 10, 11, and 12.  The OECD Model differs from the US Model in 
that it provides for source-country tax rates of 5% in the case of dividends held by 25% or 
greater corporate shareholders, 15% in the case of all other dividends, 10% in the case of 
interest, and zero in the case of royalties.  OECD Model Arts. 10, 11, and 12.  As discussed 
in Part II, Section C, the UN Model leaves the maximum tax rate blank, implying that 
countries should negotiate a higher rate in the case of treaties between developed and less 
developed countries.  UN Model Arts. 10, 11, and 12. 
141 U.S.-Jamaica, Art. 10, para. 2(a). 
142 U.S.-Jamaica, Art. 10, para. 2(b). 
143 U.S.-Jamaica, Art. 11. 
144 U.S.-Jamaica, Art. 12. 
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U.S. tax treaties, including one with Mexico, an LDC.  The U.S. agreed to 
eliminate source-country taxation on direct dividends paid with respect to 
stock held by foreign controlling parent companies145 in a recent protocol to 
the Mexico-U.S tax treaty.146  A most-favored nation provision in the 
original treaty147 caused the elimination of source-country taxes on these 
direct dividends when the U.S. negotiated the same provision in recent 
treaties and protocols with Australia,148 Japan,149 and Britain.150  According 
to Treasury officials, the elimination of source-country tax on direct 
dividends earned by foreign controlling companies reduces tax barriers and 
increases the economic ties between the partner countries.151  Following the 
logic of this position, a Ghana-U.S. tax treaty should involve a significant 
lowering, if not complete elimination, of source-country taxation of 
dividends.  The fact that the U.S. tax treaty with Mexico, an LDC, very 
 
 
145 Those owning at least 80% of the foreign subsidiary’s stock. 
146 See Second Additional Protocol that Modifies the Convention for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, 
Nov. 26, 2002, U.S.-Mex., art. II, TIAS; see also Report of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on the Additional Protocol Modifying the Income Tax Convention with 
Mexico, S 108-4, Sec. VI, Part A (March 13, 2003) (protocols eliminate tax on certain 
direct dividends). 
147 See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Income Taxes, Sep. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., art. 10, Protocol, art. 8, 
TIAS (“If the United States agrees in a treaty with another country to impose a lower rate 
on dividends than the rate specified … both Contracting States shall apply that lower rate 
instead of the rate specified….”). 
148 Protocol Amending the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, May, 2003, U.S.-Austl., 
art. 6. 
149 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income Nov. 6, 2003, U.S.-Japan, art 11, TIAS (entered 
into force July 1, 2004). 
150 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, Jul. 24, 2001, U.S.-U.K., 
art. 10, TIAS.   
151 See STAFF OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM, 108TH CONG., REPORT ON 
THE CONVENTION WITH JAPAN (Comm. Print 2003) (noting that many bilateral tax treaties 
to which the United States is not a party eliminate taxes on direct dividends, that the EU’s 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive achieves the same result, and that the United States has signed 
treaty documents with the U.K. and Australia that include provisions similar to the one in 
the Mexico protocol); see also Treasury Secretary John W. Snow Remarks at the U.S.-
Japan Income Tax Treaty Signing Ceremony, November 6, 2003, (stating that the new 
Japan-U.S. Treaty will significantly reduce existing tax-related barriers to trade and 
investment between Japan and the United States and will foster closer economic ties 
between the two countries). 
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recently adopted this position would seem to support the expectation of a 
similar provision in a tax treaty with Ghana.  
However, the more likely result is that in a Ghana-U.S. tax treaty, 
source-country tax rates on dividends would be closer to the rates found in 
the Jamaica treaty than those found in the Mexico treaty.152  In other recent 
U.S. tax treaty negotiations with LDCs, none incorporate a zero rate for 
dividends paid to controlling company shareholders, and all provide for 
maximum source-country tax rates on passive income items that are higher 
than those provided in the US Model.153 
Thus, as in the case of the permanent establishment provisions, the 
higher source-country rates that are typical in U.S. tax treaties with LDCs 
would likely be suggested, negotiated and agreed to in a Ghana-U.S. tax 
treaty.154  Using the Jamaica-U.S. treaty and other recent treaties with LDCs 
as a guide, a Ghana-U.S. tax treaty could be expected to provide maximum 
source-country tax rates of 10% to 15% on direct dividends, 10 to 15% on 
regular dividends,155 and 10% on interest and royalties. 
The narrower permanent establishment thresholds and higher source-
country tax rates are expected in a Ghana-U.S. tax treaty because they 
continue to appear in other U.S. tax treaties with LDCs.  They appear in 
these treaties because it is believed that they will provide some benefit to 
the governments of the LDCs entering into these agreements.  Yet, the 
overriding purpose of these treaties is the same as that for treaties 
 
 
152 The Mexico treaty now provides for a maximum of 5% source-country taxation on 
direct dividends, 10% on regular dividends, and zero on direct dividends paid to foreign 
companies with a controlling interest in the paying company.  See Mexico Protocol of 
2002, supra note 146. 
153 See, e.g., Sri Lanka-U.S., supra note 43, art. 10, 11, and 12 (providing maximum 
rates of 15% on all dividends, and 10% on interest and royalties); Bangladesh-U.S., supra 
note 43 (same rates as in Sri Lanka-U.S. treaty).  Other than the lower rates on dividends, 
the Mexico-U.S. treaty is consistent with other tax treaties with LDCs in that it provides for 
maximum source-country tax rates of 15% on interest and 10% on royalties.  See Mexico-
U.S., supra note 147. 
154 See the U.S. tax treaties with Greece (a developed country), the former countries of 
the U.S.S.R. (each a transition country), and Trinidad & Tobago (an LDC), each providing 
for a maximum 30% source-country tax rate for dividends, and those with Israel (a 
developed country), India, and the Philippines (each an LDC), providing a maximum 25% 
rate.  The newest U.S. tax treaty, with Sri Lanka (an LDC), provides for a 15% tax rate on 
all dividends.  The Sri Lanka treaty was considered by the Senate in February, 2004 
together with the Japan-U.S. Treaty, which provides for zero taxation on certain dividends 
paid to controlling shareholders.  See Testimony of the Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on the Proposed Tax 
Treaties with Japan and Sri Lanka, 108th Cong. (2004). 
155 32 of the U.S. tax treaties currently in force provide a rate of 10% on regular 
dividends.   
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exclusively between developed countries: they are supposed to relieve 
double taxation and therefore increase cross-border investment between  the 
partner countries.  The next section explores the extent to which either of 
these goals are achieved under the hypothetical tax treaty between Ghana 
and the U.S. described above. 
C. Effect of a Ghana-U.S. Tax Treaty on Potential U.S. Investors 
Assuming that Ghana is a viable destination for U.S. investment as 
described above, a tax treaty between these two countries would 
theoretically complement U.S. investment interests as well as its trade and 
aid initiatives.  However, this section demonstrates that in today’s global tax 
climate, a tax treaty that follows the international standards set forth in the 
model treaties may be ineffective in achieving its goals.  This may occur as 
a result of several inter-related phenomena. 
First, the scope of tax treaties appears to be too narrow in the context of 
these LDCs.  Second, double taxation appears to be disappearing in 
international transactions involving these LDCs as a result of the 
widespread reduction in taxation caused by global tax competition and an 
ever-increasing availability of opportunities to avoid and evade income 
taxation.   Third, there may be little differential between tax treaties and 
statutory law in the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa.  Fourth, tax treaties may 
have little impact on multinational investment behavior in the face of non-
tax issues, such as inadequate infrastructure, in LDCs.  Finally, tax treaties 
may offer little more than perception about the commercial and legal 
climate of a country for foreign investment.   
Because of the impact of each of these factors on global commercial 
activity, a tax treaty between Ghana and the U.S. would yield an 
insignificant impact on investment and trade between these two countries.  
Each of these factors, and their effect on the potential impact of a tax treaty, 
is discussed below. 
1. Non-Comparable Taxation 
The first phenomenon that tends to reduce the potential benefit of a tax 
treaty between the U.S. and Ghana is the fact that U.S. multinationals are 
likely to face non-income taxation in Ghana.156  Like many LDCs, Ghana 
relies on a broad range of taxes that are not relieved under treaty, including 
 
 
156 That is, if they face any taxation at all.  See infra, section 2.   
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consumption, excise, and trade taxes.157  The reliance on trade and excise 
taxes is historical, arising out of developed country practices that have since 
been abandoned in developed countries in favor of personal income taxation 
and, outside of the U.S., consumption taxation in the form of the value 
added tax (VAT).158 
Value added taxes are relatively new to LDCs, having been introduced 
in the 1970s and 1980s, largely as a result of tax reforms initiated by 
international monetary organizations as a condition of lending.159  Prior to 
the introduction of the VAT, many LDCs, including those in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, historically relied heavily on trade taxes for revenue following the 
customs of the developed world that were introduced under colonization.160  
The increased focus on the VAT was part of an overall effort to gradually 
reduce and eventually allow complete elimination of taxes on international 
trade.161 
 
 
157 See, e.g., Guttentag, supra note 4, at 452 (“we have noted a trend where developing 
countries question the desirability of maintaining high source based taxation, but need to 
find alternative sources of revenue… many of them rely to a lesser extent on OECD type 
tax systems…instead, there is a greater reliance on value added taxes and asset taxes.”). 
158 The shift from trade to income and consumption taxation in the U.S. and other 
developed countries is discussed in WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS, supra note , at 14, 
42, 44; William D. Samson, History of Taxation, in THE INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 
SYSTEM 33–35 (Andrew Lymer & John Hasseldine, Eds., 2002).; and Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2000). 
159 From 1950, when the VAT in its modern form emerged, until 1980, many countries 
shifted from consumption taxes to payroll (social security) taxes, and since 1980 many 
countries have begun to shift from personal income taxes to VAT.  Ken Messare, Flip de 
Kam & Christopher Heady, TAX POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN OECD COUNTRIES 28 
(2003).  See also Malcolm Gillis, Tax Reform and Value-Added Tax: Indonesia, in WORLD 
TAX REFORM: CASE STUDIES OF DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 227 (Michael 
Boskin & Charles E. McClure Jr., eds., 1990); Stewart (2003), supra note 4 at 169.   
160 Vito Tanzi, Taxation in Developing Countries, in TAX SYSTEMS IN NORTH 
AMERICA AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 8-9 (Luigi Bernardi & Jeffrey Owens, eds., 1994) 
(discussing revenue composition in LDCs).  Trade taxes averaged about 27 percent of total 
revenues from 1994 to 1999 in Sub-Saharan Africa largely, from 5 percent of revenues 
collected in Angola to 49 percent in Uganda.  Scott Riswold, IMF VAT Policy in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 2003 WTD, Sep. 1, 2003.  For a discussion of the impact of colonization 
on tax systems in LDCs, see Stewart (2003), supra note 4 at 145. 
161 Such efforts have been encouraged by international monetary organizations such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as part of an overall tax reform 
package introduced in various forms as a condition to ongoing lending arrangements.  
Stewart (2003), supra note 4 at 170. 
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In Ghana, a 20% VAT was introduced in 1995 and quickly repealed in 
the face of violent protests.162  After a lengthy educational campaign, the 
government reinstated the VAT, this time at 10%, in 1998.163  Since then, 
the VAT has not led to a decrease in any other taxes.  A decrease in 
international trade taxes (tariffs) and excise taxes was initially realized soon 
after introduction of the VAT, but this trend has since reversed itself, and 
these taxes are currently increasing as a percentage of total revenues 
collected.164  Moreover, a temporary rise in corporate income taxation that 
accompanied the introduction of the VAT appears to have leveled off, and 
corporate tax rates are currently decreasing.165  As a result, the introduction 
of VAT in Ghana has lead to an overall increase in taxes that are not 
addressed by treaties.166 
Finally, investors are likely to encounter non-comparable taxation in 
Ghana as a result of government stake-holding in many formerly state-
owned enterprises.  For example, cocoa produced in Ghana is not subject to 
income taxation,167 but is subject to levy by the Ghana Cocoa Board, a 
monopsony for the international sale of Ghanaian cocoa products.168  
Similarly, income taxation on Ghanaian mining activities approaches zero, 
 
 
162 Ghana, Despite Its Successes, Is Swept by Anti-Tax Protests, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, May 23, 1995, sec. A, p. 6, col. 3 (describing VAT-related riot that led to 5 deaths). 
163 Miranda Stewart & Sunita Jogarajan, The International Monetary Fund and Tax 
Reform, 2004 BRITISH TAX REVIEW no. 2, 146, 155 (2004). 
164 The remainder of Ghana’s tax revenue derives from excise taxes, mainly on 
petroleum.  Ernest Aryeetey, THE STATE OF THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY IN 2002 26 (2003).   
165 Id. 
166 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, From Income to Consumption: Some International 
Implications, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1329, 1350 (1996) (theorizing the obsolescence of the 
U.S. tax treaty network in the event the U.S. adopts a consumption tax and repeals the 
income tax, since “[f]undamentally, income tax conventions apply to taxes on ‘income and 
capital’”). There are some tax treaties that address consumption taxes, specifically value-
added taxes (VAT).  However, in most countries, the VAT employed is destination-based, 
meaning that exports are exempt from VAT and imports are subject to VAT.  As a result, 
double VAT is avoided to a certain extent without need for international agreement (some 
double taxation will continue to occur to the extent there are varying definitions of 
exempted and included items).  The inconsistency occurs to various degrees in every 
country that employs a VAT.  However, developed countries continue to rely more heavily 
than LDCs on income taxation, which is relieved by, and therefore necessitates the 
continued existence of, tax treaties.   
167 G.I.R.A § 11 (“income from cocoa of a cocoa farmer is exempt from tax”). 
168 Acting as the intermediary between farmers and the global market, the Ghana 
Cocoa Board has the “sole responsibility for the sale and export of Ghana cocoa beans,” 
and delivers only a fraction of realized proceeds to farmers, thus imposing a gross basis tax 
that currently approximates some 33%.  See Ghana Cocoa Board Prices, at 
http://www.cocobod.gh/GCBP_export_prices.cfm. See also Aryeetey, supra note 164. 
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but the government extracts mining profits by owning shares in all mining 
operations and requiring the payment of dividends on such shares.169 Thus a 
focus on the VAT, income, international trade, and excise taxes in Ghana 
provides only an incomplete picture of the full burden of taxation imposed 
in this country.  As treaties focus only on income taxation, they address 
taxation in LDCs to a very limited degree. 
2. Decreasing Global Tax Burdens 
As non-comparable taxation increases, income taxation is decreasing 
throughout the world.  As a result, multinationals investing in LDCs may 
face little or no income taxation on their foreign earnings.  First, taxation 
may be reduced or eliminated by residence countries pursuant to rules that 
provide assets in offshore companies an indefinite suspension (“deferral”) 
of residence-based taxation.  Second, taxation may be reduced or eliminated 
by source countries pursuant to tax incentives that eliminate taxation for a 
specified duration or perpetually.  Third, taxation by both countries may be 
reduced or eliminated through strategies of tax avoidance and evasion.  
Finally, taxation by both countries may be reduced or eliminated pursuant 
to express efforts to do so by both taxing jurisdictions, usually through a tax 
treaty.  The combination of reduction or elimination of taxation in both 
countries, whether express or not, leads to complete non-taxation170 of 
multinational activities.  As discussed more fully below, the resulting lack 
of taxation obviates the need to pursue tax relief under treaty. 
Reduced Taxation Through Deferral 
As discussed above, most developed countries impose taxation on a 
worldwide basis, yet most protect this right only with respect to certain 
items of income, allowing suspension of taxation on other items to continue 
indefinitely at the will of the shareholders.171  Thus, despite the support for 
the primacy of residence-based taxation that originally served as a major 
reason for entering into tax treaties,172 much residence-based taxation is 
undermined by the persistent allowance of deferral.   
Deferral is antithetical to residence-based taxation.  By allowing it, 
nominally residence-based jurisdictions like the U.S. mirror territorial 
 
 
169 Aryeetey, supra note 164. 
170 Sometimes called double non-taxation to indicate the coordinative effort that 
produces it. 
171 See supra, text at note 36. 
172 See supra, text at note 68. 
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systems by effectively providing tax exemption for foreign income.173  
Deferral is defended on grounds of neutrality: it is argued that companies 
from residence-based countries like the U.S. face heavier global tax burdens 
than companies from territorial countries, when both operate in third 
countries that impose little or no source-based taxation.  For example, it is 
suggested that U.S.-based multinational companies operating abroad may 
be subject to little source-based taxation as foreign countries compete to 
attract their investment by offering low tax burdens, but because of the U.S. 
system of worldwide taxation, the U.S.-based company is still subject to the 
higher U.S. domestic tax rates.  In contrast, it is supposed that 
multinationals from territorial systems will have a tax advantage in the 
minimally-taxing foreign country because these companies can combine 
low taxation abroad with exemption at home.174   
Based on this argument, deferral continues to be vigorously defended 
under CIN principles, as requisite to allow U.S. companies to compete in 
low-tax countries against the multinational companies of territorial 
jurisdictions.175  That few multinational companies are actually residents of 
 
 
173 See Peroni (1997), supra note 65.  Passive income items such as dividends, interest, 
and royalties, are generally not eligible for deferral and are therefore subject to current tax 
in the U.S.   
174 See Roin, supra note 63 at 114 (citing deferral proponents who argue that “[a]ny 
businesses that Americans can successfully operate in low tax jurisdictions…foreign 
investors can carry on equally well [and that if deferral was ended] foreign investors would 
use their now unique tax advantage to overwhelm their American competitors, wherever 
located”).  
175 See, e.g., Mark Warren, Repealing the Deferral Rule: The Wrong Answer to U.S. 
Job Losses (Republican Policy Committee, May 3, 2004), reprinted in 2004 WTD 88-16 
(arguing that “some countries” exempt the foreign earnings of their multinationals, U.S. 
companies would face a higher overall tax burden when operating in low-tax jurisdictions 
in the absence of deferral, and that U.S. companies “cannot be expected to compete if they 
are handicapped by a 35- percent corporate-tax rate on their worldwide income”); National 
Foreign Trade Council, Inc., The NFTC Foreign Income Project: International Tax Policy 
for the 21st Century-Part One: A Reconsideration of Subpart F, 1999 WTD 58-37 (Mar. 
25, 1999), and related Statement of Fred F. Murray, Vice President for Tax Policy National 
Foreign Trade Council, Inc. Testimony Before the House Committee on Ways and Means  
Hearing on Impact of U.S. Tax Rules on International Competitiveness June 30, 1999, at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/fullcomm/106cong/6-30-99/630murr.htm (arguing 
that “if the local tax rate in the company of operation is less than the U.S. rate, … 
competitors will be more lightly taxed than their U.S.-based competition,” whether they are 
locally based or foreign, unless “their home countries impose a regime that is as broad as 
subpart F, and none have to date done so”).  The argument is perhaps as old as taxation 
itself.  In the newly independent United States, import duties were favored over export 
duties or other forms of taxation, because the imposition of either export duties or property 
taxes on farmers would equally increase the price of goods destined for export, thus serving 
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territorial systems,176 and deferral provides the equivalent to exemption for 
much of the foreign income earned by U.S. multinationals while 
simultaneously providing them with a competitive advantage over their 
domestic counterparts177 appears to have little effect on the efforts of U.S. 
multinationals to preserve the deferral privilege.178 
The effect of deferral is to increase the sensitivity of U.S. taxpayers to 
foreign tax rates, thus forcing source countries to continually lower their 
internal tax burdens so as to attract the ever more demanding foreign 
capital.  Deferral thus causes tax competition, as any income taxation 
imposed by a  source country such as Ghana subjects a potential foreign 
investor to a burden it could otherwise avoid.179  Elimination of competition 
and tax sensitivity could be achieved if all countries adhered to CEN.  
However, this would require international coordination and cooperation to a 
degree that appears overwhelmingly unattainable.180 
                                                                                                                            
to “enable others to undersell us abroad.”  See COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES IN 
CONGRESS ASSEMBLED, REPLY TO THE RHODE ISLAND OBJECTIONS, TOUCHING IMPORT 
DUTIES, December 16, 1782 (reprinted in 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 100-106  (Jonathon Elliot, ed., Lenox Hill Pub., 
1974) (1836). 
176 For example, of the top 100 multinationals, 18 are from generally territorial systems 
(one from Hong Kong, three from Switzerland, one from Malaysia, and 13 from France).  
Since France imposes a form of world-wide taxation on low-taxed earnings of controlled 
foreign companies, even this number is an exaggeration.  Other countries may impose 
worldwide income generally, but exempt the foreign income of their multinationals under 
treaty.  See The Top 100 TNCs, Ranked By Foreign Assets, 2000, supra note 81. 
177 Domestic companies are subject to worldwide taxation, and cannot generally opt to 
suspend the taxation of their profits.  See generally, Clifton Fleming Jr., Robert J. Peroni & 
Stephen E. Shay, An Alternative View of Deferral: Considering a Proposal to Curtail, not 
Expand, Deferral, 2000 WTD 20-13 (Jan. 31, 2000) (arguing that deferral is a subsidy for 
operating business abroad and that proponents of deferral “have not candidly 
acknowledged the broad nature of the scope of the existing deferral privilege”). 
178 See supra, note 175. 
179 Deferral removes the existing (residual) tax burden, thereby ensuring that any tax 
imposed by a foreign country is a tax wedge.  In the absence of deferral, the tax wedge is 
created by the home country and, outside of limitations on foreign tax credits, taxes 
imposed by the source country do not increase the wedge.  For a discussion of the 
interaction of deferral and the subsequent efforts of source countries to eliminate tax 
wedges, see Dagan, supra note 41. 
180 See Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and A Multilateral Treaty, 26 
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1641, 1681 (2001) (an internationally harmonized system is “too utopian 
to merit discussion”), and Charles E. McLure, Jr., Tax Policies for the XXIst Century, in 
VISIONS OF THE TAX SYSTEMS OF THE XXIST CENTURY (1996); but see Yariv Brauner, An 
International Tax Regime In Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV 259 (2003) (arguing that there 
has been a “modelization” of the international tax rules that could be built upon to achieve 
some measure of rule harmonization).  Recent developments in the EU indicate that less, 
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The consequence is that U.S. multinationals may generally avoid U.S. 
taxation on their foreign income by operating through subsidiary companies 
in source countries,181 which they generally do.182  As suspension and 
effective elimination of taxation on foreign income becomes the norm in the 
developed world, LDCs respond accordingly, by increasingly offering 
corresponding tax relief in the form of tax incentives.  These incentives 
have become a standard tool for capturing a share of the global flow of 
foreign investment.183  
Reduced Taxation Through Tax Incentives  
Tax incentives of various forms are used by most countries to encourage 
particular behavior in taxpayers, and neither the U.S. nor Ghana is an 
exception.  The U.S. employs numerous tax incentives to attract foreign 
investment or encourage domestic investment.  These provisions are 
generally embedded in the tax base, rather than being reflected in the tax 
                                                                                                                            
rather than more, cooperation is likely.  See Joann M. Weiner, EU Governments Fear 
Increased Tax Competition in Wake of Accession, 2004 WTD 81-1 (Apr 6, 2004), and 
European Commission Rejects Effort For Harmonized Corporate Tax Rates, DAILY TAX 
REPORT G-8, June 1, 2004. 
181 Shay (2004), supra note 202, at 31 (multinationals are free to choose to operate 
through a branch or subsidiary, and they will generally choose subsidiary form unless the 
foreign effective tax rate is greater than the U.S rate or if they benefit from pooling high- 
and low-taxed earnings). 
182 For example, several of the largest foreign investments in Ghana are U.S. controlled 
foreign corporations (CFCs), including the Volta Aluminum Company, Ltd, Regimanuel 
Gray, and Equatorial Bottlers, discussed supra at note 103.  Operating through a domestic 
subsidiary is also more advantageous from a Ghanaian perspective, since foreign 
companies are subject to strict scrutiny from the taxing and regulatory authorities to an 
extent exceeding that paid to domestic companies.  The differential treatment is especially 
acute in the case of mining and other extractive operations, which are strictly regulated and 
limited as to foreign ownership by the Government of Ghana.  Interview with Bernard 
Ahafor, supra note 204.   See also Shay (2004), supra note 202, at 31 (multinationals are 
free to choose to operate through a branch or subsidiary, and they will generally choose 
subsidiary form unless the foreign effective tax rate is greater than the U.S rate or if they 
benefit from pooling high- and low-taxed earnings).   
183 The evidence is perhaps most obvious in regards to the number of countries 
offering tax holidays—over one hundred in 1998 and increasing—and the share of foreign 
investment directed at tax havens that are decried by the OECD for their harmful tax 
practices.  While these countries command a fraction of the world’s population and its 
GDP, they attract a disproportionately large amount of U.S. foreign investment capital.  See 
Avi-Yonah (2000), supra note 158, at 1577, 1589, and 1643.     
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art20
2005] Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid 43 
 
rate.184  For example, along with the privilege of deferral, tax credits for 
research and development (R&D) and accelerated depreciation deductions 
are among the major tax incentives offered by the United States.185 
Ghana also offers accelerated depreciation deductions and R&D credits 
similar to—but perhaps not as generous as—those of the United States.186  
 
 
184 Since the 1960s, an awareness of the danger of the hidden costs of such incentives 
has led to expenditure budgeting, which quantifies the cost of embedded provisions.  For an 
example, see Analytical Perspectives (2004), supra note 65, explaining the concept of 
expenditures and providing a selected list.  Incentives currently embedded in the U.S. tax 
base include accelerated depreciation and exclusions of certain forms of income such as 
tax-exempt interest.  Tax incentives include any exclusions or exemptions that reduce or 
defer the tax base.  See generally Alex Easson & Eric Zolt, Tax Incentives, World Bank 
Course on Practical Issues of Tax Policy in Developing Countries, April 28-May 1, 2003 at 
3, at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/publicfinance/documents/taxpolicy/Zolt&Easson.pdf 
(“tax incentives can take the form of tax holidays for a limited duration, current 
deductibility for certain types of expenditures, or reduced import tariffs or customs”).  
Ireland and Belgium, which offer low rates for foreign investors, are exceptions (and a 
source of consternation to their OECD counterparts) to the general rule of tax base rather 
than tax rate concessions in developed countries.  See, e.g., Avi-Yonah (2000), supra note 
158, at 1601. 
185 Congress first provided a deduction for research and experimental expenditures in 
1981, because it saw a decline in research activities it attributed to inadequacies in the IRC 
§ 174 deduction, which at that time only applied to investment in machinery and equipment 
employed in research or experimental activities.  Congress concluded that “in order to 
reverse this decline in research spending … a substantial tax credit for incremental research 
and experimental expenditures was needed.”  JCS-71-81, General Explanation of the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (H.R. 4242, 97th Congress, P.L. 97-34), GPO 
December 31, 1981, at section C.    In the same act, Congress provided for accelerated 
depreciation deduction allowances because the existing depreciation deduction allowances 
“did not provide the investment stimulus that was felt to be essential for economic 
expansion.”  Id at Section A.  Enhanced bonus depreciation provisions were enacted in 
2001 under the theory that “allowing additional first-year depreciation will accelerate 
purchases of equipment, promote capital investment, modernization, and growth, and will 
help to spur an economic recovery,”  HR. Rep. No. 107-251, House Ways and Means 
Committee Report on Economic Security and Recovery Act of 2001, at Part II, Title I, 
section A.  Bonus depreciation was expanded in 2003 for the same reason.  H.R. Rep. No. 
108-94, House Ways and Means Committee Reports on P.L. 108-27 (Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003) at section 201. (“increasing and extending the additional 
first-year depreciation will accelerate purchases of equipment, promote capital investment, 
modernization, and growth, … help to spur an economic recovery … [and] increase 
employment opportunities in the years ahead). See also Richard E. Andersen, IRS Relaxes 
Rules for Research Credit: Opportunities for R&D-Intensive Multinationals, 4 J. Taxn. 
Global Trans. 17 (Spring, 2004) (discussing structures with which foreign and domestic 
multinationals can use R&D credits to generate tax-free profits in the U.S., and citing a 
2003 study by Bain & Co, entitled “Addressing the Innovation Divide,” in which it was 
found that in the past decade, European drug makers placed their R&D in the United States 
versus in local expansion by a two-to-one margin). 
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However, most LDCs including Ghana also offer significantly more 
generous incentives, in the form of low corporate tax rates and myriad tax 
exemptions.187  Ghana imposes only an 8% tax on income from the export 
of most goods, rates ranging from 16 to 25% for certain industries and 
businesses carried out in certain geographic areas, and complete exemption 
from taxation (tax holidays) for periods ranging from 3 to 10 years for new 
activities conducted in certain industries or geographic areas.188  Many 
LDCs, including Ghana, have also set aside geographic areas as havens 
from the normal tax and regulatory regimes, specifically to host 
manufacturing and processing plants (free zones).  In Ghana’s free zone, 
established in 1995, companies enjoy a ten year tax holiday followed by tax 
rates never to exceed 8%.189   
International organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF 
currently decry the harm that tax holidays cause in depriving LDCs of 
much-needed revenue.190  The elimination of income taxation on corporate 
taxpayers, coupled with the pressure to reduce taxes on international trade, 
 
 
187 For example, by 1998, over 100 countries had tax holidays.  Avi-Yonah (2000), 
supra note 158. 
188 G.I.R.A. §11 (Industry Concessions) and First Schedule, Part II (Rates of Income 
Tax Upon Companies).  Although tax holidays are limited in duration, insufficient 
enforcement prevents the IRS from curbing instances in which companies facing expiring 
tax holidays simply dissolve and reincorporate under a different name to restart the clock.  
Interview with Kweku Ackaah-Boafo, February 6, 2004 (Discussing a Canadian company 
well known to have dissolved and reincorporated to avail itself of tax benefits). 
189 G.I.R.A., First Schedule.  
190 See, e.g., Janet Stotsky, Summary of IMF Tax Policy Advice, in TAX POLICY 
HANDBOOK 279, 283 (Parthasarathi Shome, ed. International Monetary Fund 1995) (stating 
that tax incentives “have proved to be largely ineffective, while causing serious distortions 
and inequities in corporate taxation”); Zmarak Shaliz, LESSONS OF TAX REFORM 60 (1991) 
(“The use of so-called tax expenditures (tax preferences and exemptions to promote 
specific economic and social objectives) should, in general, be deemphasized.”).  This is a 
reversal of position for the World Bank, which at one point encouraged LDCs to offer tax 
incentives to attract foreign investment, and was concerned with the effect elimination of 
tax incentives might have on its assistance projects.  Stewart (2003), supra note 4 at 169, 
text at note 186; Shaliz (1991) at 68-69.  The World Bank has since “recommended the 
removal or tightening of incentives in Argentina (1989), Bangladesh (1989), Brazil (1989), 
Ghana (1989), and Turkey (1987), among others.”  Shaliz (1991) at 69.  Tax incentives are 
also contrary to WTO rules prohibiting tax subsidies.  See WTO Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures, Art. 1, para. 1.1.  However, these provisions are rarely 
enforced with respect to LDCs.  See Reuven Avi-Yonah & Martin B. Tittle, Foreign Direct 
Investment in Latin America: Overview and Current Status, Inter-American Development 
Bank (2002), at 
http://www.iadb.org/INT/Trade/1_english/2_WhatWeDo/1d_TaxDocuments.htm. 
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has created critical revenue shortfalls in many countries.191  Nevertheless, 
new tax incentives continue to be introduced in both developed and less 
developed countries around the world,192 often in response to private sector 
lobbying.193  Some recent examples include the introduction of a new free 
zone in the United Arab Emirates,194 a new five-year exemption period for 
audit, accounting, and law firms in Singapore,195  and a new ten-year 
corporate tax holiday for income from investments of at least €150 million 
in Turkey.196  
As a result of these kinds of initiatives, U.S. multinationals may face 
little or no income taxation on income derived in LDCs.  The impact of tax 
treaties on activities giving rise to such income is therefore minimized, as 
double taxation, and even single taxation, is avoided through unilateral tax 
rules.  However, even if home or  source countries nominally impose 
taxation on multinationals, widespread tax avoidance and evasion 
neutralizes these taxes.  Tax treaties appear to have little effect in these 
circumstances. 
Reduced Taxation Through Tax Avoidance and Evasion  
In the event that deferral or tax incentives are not available, 
multinational companies manage their worldwide tax exposure by using tax 
planning techniques to shift income to low- or no-tax jurisdictions through 
earnings stripping, transfer pricing, thin capitalization, and similar means of 
tax avoidance and, in the extreme, tax evasion.197  For example, U.S. 
 
 
191 Cordia Scott & Sirena J. Scales, Tax Competition Harms Developing Countries, 
IMF official Says, 2003 WTD 238-9 (Dec. 10, 2003).  
192 For example, see Kwang-Yeol Yoo, Corporate Taxation of Foreign Direct 
Investment Income 1991-2001, OECD Economics Department Working Papers No.365, at 
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2003doc.nsf/43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/48ae491b
8e2db4a9c1256d8e003b567f/$FILE/JT00148239.PDF. 
193 For example, see David Roberto R. Soares da Silva, Tech Companies in Brazil Seek 
Tax Incentives to Promote R&D, 2004 WTD 138-6 (Jul. 19, 2004) (domestic and 
multinational technology companies are currently lobbying for a three-year exemption 
from federal taxes for income from sales of “all new products that contain significant 
technological innovation”). 
194 Under this new initiative, free-zone companies in Dubai will be exempt from 
income and tax.  See Cordia Scott, Dubai Woos Europe With Tax-Free Outsourcing Zone, 
2004 WTD 118-12 (Jun. 17, 2004). 
195 Lisa J. Bender, Singapore Launches Tax Incentives for Audit, Accounting, Law 
Firms, 2004 WTD 66-5 (Apr. 5, 2004). 
196 Mustafa Çamlica, Turkey Plans Tax Holidays for Large Investments, 2004 WTD 
82-8 (Apr. 28, 2004).  
197 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the 
Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 95 (1995) (“transfer pricing 
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multinationals typically use over- and under-invoicing to assign foreign 
profits to subsidiaries in tax havens.198  As a result, firms can increasingly 
make physical location decisions that are largely independent of tax-related 
business decisions, shifting profits to the most advantageous tax 
destination.199  Efforts by governments to curb such practices are 
abundant200 but largely ineffective201 in the face of efforts by taxpayers to 
engage in them.202  
                                                                                                                            
manipulation is one of the simplest ways to avoid taxation”); David Harris, Randall Morck, 
Joel Slemrod & Bernard Yeung, Income Shifting in U.S. Multinational Corporations, in 
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 277, 301 (Alberto Giovannini, R. Glenn Hubbard & 
Joel Slemrod eds., 1993), and James R. Hines, Jr., Tax Policy and the Activities of 
Multinational Corporations, in FISCAL POLICY: LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC RESEARCH 401, 
414-15 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1997).  The line between tax avoidance and tax evasion is 
murky.  Tax avoidance generally refers to lawful attempts to minimize taxation, as Judge 
Learned Hand famously noted in Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850 (U.S. Circ. 
Ct App, 2d Circ. 1947) (“Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister 
in so arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or 
poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law 
demands…”).  Tax evasion generally encompasses the unlawful and fraudulent avoidance 
of tax accomplished by hiding taxable income and assets from taxing authorities.   
198 See Council of the European Union, Final Draft Report of the Ad hoc Working 
Party on Tax Fraud 4, 16 (Brussels, April 27 2000) (direct tax fraud is typically committed 
through false invoicing, under-and over-invoicing, non-declaration of income earned in 
foreign jurisdictions, and “use by taxpayers of a fictitious tax domicile, with the purpose to 
evade fulfilling their tax obligations in their country of domicile for tax purposes”); see 
also Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Multinationals Move More Profits to Tax Havens, 2004 WTD 
31-4 (Feb. 9, 2004) (although they comprise just 13% of productive capacity and 9% of 
employment, subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals located in the top 11 tax havens were 
assigned 46.3% of foreign profits in 2001), and Hooke, supra note 119, at 86 (suggesting 
that to control costs, it is “sound operating procedure” for a foreign investor of an export 
platform in a LDC to interpose an offshore bank, and overcharge the foreign company for 
imported supplies and management fees to reduce income in the  source country.). 
199 See Christoph Spengel & Anne Schäfer, International Tax Planning in the Age of 
ICT, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 04-27 (2004), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=552061 (arguing 
that information and commercial technology makes geographic distances “less relevant” 
and allows companies to choose location and form of investment on the basis of 
international tax differentials).  
200 Transfer pricing rules are a common feature in the tax systems of most countries, as 
are rules denying deductions for interest and royalties in certain cases and, often, rules 
requiring a certain combination of debt and equity (thin capitalization rules).   
201 In the U.S., the transfer pricing rules are long and complicated and constantly 
evolving, but still considered inadequate in preventing profit-shifting, as are U.S. earnings- 
and interest-stripping rules (see IRC § 163(j); these are essentially thin capitalization rules), 
each of which are similarly limited in their success in curbing avoidance of U.S. taxation.  
For an overview of U.S. efforts to control transfer pricing, see Avi-Yonah (1995), supra 
note 197.  For a recent example of the failure of interest stripping rules, consider the 
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In LDCs such as Ghana, where enforcement of the tax law has been 
relatively less of a focus than reform of the tax law, tax authorities are all 
but helpless against these practices.203  It is popularly said that Ghanaian 
companies keep three sets of books: one for the banks, showing large profits 
so as to secure financing; one for the Ghanaian Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS), showing large losses so as to avoid paying taxes; and one set, very 
closely-guarded by the owners, that contains the most accurate 
information.204  There is no official data available regarding whether, and to 
what extent, U.S. multinationals take advantage of enforcement 
weaknesses.205  Ghana recently introduced a Large Taxpayers Unit to curtail 
tax evasion, but the Ghanaian IRS relies on the good faith of company 
officials and their independent auditors because the resources are lacking to 
perform audits on all but a few companies.206  Given that the overall tax 
                                                                                                                            
growing use of Canadian Income Funds to avoid the application of IRC § 163(j).  See, e.g., 
Jack Bernstein & Barbara Worndl, Canadian-U.S. Cross-Border Income Trusts: New 
Variations, 34 TAX NOTES INT'L 3-281 (April 19, 2004).  
202 See, e.g., Stephen E. Shay, Exploring Alternatives to Subpart F, 82 TAXES 3-29, 36 
(March, 2004) (“The drive on the part of taxpayers, multinational and others, to push down 
effective tax rates has accelerated in recent years.”). 
203 See Stewart (2003), supra note 4. 
204 Interviews with Margaret K. Insaidoo, Justice of the High Court of Ghana, 
Tuesday, Dec. 9, 2003; Bernard Ahafor (Attorney, Private Practice), Tuesday, Dec. 2, 
2003; and Sefah Ayebeng (Chief Inspector of Taxes, Internal Revenue Service), Thursday, 
Dec. 11, 2003.  Notes on file with the author.  The implication is that firms keep separate 
books in an attempt to defraud the government, rather than in the ordinary course of 
keeping separate tax and cost accounting books, for which there is  generally no statutory 
proscription.  See, e.g., Charles E. Hyde & Chongwoo Choe, Keeping Two Sets of Books: 
The Relationship Between Tax & Incentive Transfer Prices (February 14, 2004), at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=522623 (arguing that keeping two sets of books with respect to 
transfer pricing is “not only legal but also typically desirable” for many MNEs). 
205 Anecdotal evidence that multinationals are thought to evade taxation where 
possible is not lacking, however.  See, e.g., Sirena J. Scales, Venezuela Temporarily Closes 
McDonald's Nationwide, 2005 WTD 26-11 (Feb. 9, 2005) (“Venezuela's Tax Agency 
(SENIAT) has temporarily closed all 80 McDonald's restaurants in the nation, citing failure 
to comply with tax rules…..”) 
206 Seth E. Terkper, Ghana Establishes Long-Awaited Large Taxpayer Unit, 2004 
WTD 64-10 (Apr. 2, 2004).  A mid-size taxpayers unit is also in the planning stages.  
Interview with Sefah Ayebeng, supra note 204.  A more effective audit process may not be 
sufficient to induce increased compliance, however.  A recent empirical study about 
Australian investors that were accused of engaging in abusive tax transactions argues that 
taxpayers’ level of trust regarding the fairness, neutrality, and respect accorded to them by 
the revenue authorities was correlated to their level of voluntary compliance, and that 
although trust alone should not be relied upon in enforcing a tax system, “a regulatory 
strategy that combines a preference for trust with an ability to switch to a policy of distrust 
is therefore likely to be the most effective.”  Kristina Murphy, The Role of Trust in 
Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Accused Tax Avoiders, 28 Law and Human Behavior, 2-
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compliance rate is estimated to be less than 20% in Ghana, good faith 
appears to be rather elusive.207   
As a consequence of tax avoidance and evasion strategies, income is 
often exempt from taxation even if it nominally applies in the residence 
country, the  source country, or both.  In such a taxing environment, there is 
little taxation, let alone double taxation, to be relieved by treaty.  
Governments are not unaware of the problem.  Tax avoidance and evasion 
has typically been addressed in treaties through information sharing 
provisions, in which the respective taxing jurisdictions agree to assist each 
other in collecting revenues.208  These provisions have a perhaps unintended 
consequence, however.  Introduction of a tax treaty may decrease 
investment, as investors seek to avoid the implementation of the 
information sharing provisions that have become standard in tax 
agreements.209   
The intersection of the taxation of portfolio interest and U.S. interest 
reporting rules provides an illustration of this tension.  The United States is 
                                                                                                                            
187 (April, 2004).  In an interesting twist, South Korea recently announced that domestic 
and foreign companies meeting target job creation goals will be free from audits in 2004 
and 2005 under a new tax incentive program.  James Lim, South Korea offering Companies 
That Create Jobs Shield From Audits, 34 DAILY TAX REPORT G-3 (February 23, 2004).   
207 The compliance rate is an estimate of Ghanaian IRS officials and not an official 
government statistic.  Interviews with Sefah Ayebeng, supra note 204 (estimating 
compliance at 20%) and Fred Ajyarkwa (official, Internal Revenue Service) (estimating it 
at 17%). 
208 The US Model requires contracting states to exchange all relevant information to 
carry out the provisions of the tax treaty or the domestic laws of the states concerning taxes 
covered by the treaty, including assessment, collection, enforcement, and prosecution 
regarding taxes covered by the convention.  See Art. 26, para. 1.  It also calls for treaty 
override of domestic bank secrecy or privacy laws. The OECD Model does not include the 
assessment/collection language but extends the scope of taxes to “every kind and 
description imposed on behalf of the contracting states.”  See Art. 26, para 1.  It does not 
include an equivalent to the US Model’s secrecy law override.  The UN Model limits 
assistance to taxes covered by the Convention as in the US Model, and explicitly adds that 
information exchange is intended to prevent fraud or evasion of taxes.  See Art. 26, para 1.   
209 Bruce A. Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies, The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on 
U.S. FDI Activity, NBER Working Paper No. w8834 (March 2002), at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8834 (showing a decrease in foreign investment upon the 
introduction of a tax treaty and suggesting that such decrease may be the result of the 
dampening effect tax treaties may have on tax evasion due to information sharing 
provisions); Ronald B. Davies, Tax Treaties, Renegotiations, and Foreign Direct 
Investment, University of Oregon Economics Working Paper No. 2003-14 (June 2003), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=436502 (“treaties have 
either a zero or even a negative effect on FDI” because they dampen the ability of 
businesses to engage in tax evasion activities, especially through transfer pricing). 
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a potential tax haven for foreign investors because of its zero tax on 
portfolio interest and rules under which banks are generally not required to 
report interest payments made to nonresident aliens.210  Efforts to require 
interest payment reporting have consistently met strong resistance by the 
private sector, which argues that such rules would “hinder tax competition 
between nations,” “undermine the global shift to lower tax rates and 
fundamental tax reform,” and “help oppressive governments track down 
flight capital.”211  Several members of Congress echo these sentiments, 
arguing that expanded reporting rules “would likely result in the flight of 
hundreds of billions of dollars from U.S. financial institutions” and could 
cause “serious, irreparable harm to the U.S. economy.”212  The implication 
is that while the U.S. does not condone tax evasion, there has emerged no 
political will strong enough to counter the private interests benefiting from 
the rules as they currently exist.213   
Similar sentiments may exist in the context of tax treaties, especially 
when the partner country, as in the case of Ghana, has a very limited ability 
to enforce the tax laws prior to the introduction of a treaty.  If foreign 
investors are able to avoid taxation in Ghana, for instance through 
aggressive tax planning, a tax treaty that requires or permits Ghana to 
provide tax information to the U.S. taxing authority may not be welcome.214  
Reduced Taxation Through Coordination (“Tax Sparing”) 
 
 
210 IRC §§ 871(h) and 882(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-5. Canadian residents are a current 
to the interest reporting rules, and proposed regulations would extend the reporting 
requirements to include all interest over $10 paid to any non-resident alien individual. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-8(a). 
211 Free Market Interest Groups Urge Treasury to Withdraw Alien Interest Reporting 
Rules, 16 DAILY TAX REPORT G-2 (January 27, 2004). 
212 House Lawmakers Ask Bush to Withdraw IRS Interest Reporting Rules for Aliens, 
69 DAILY TAX REPORT G-8 (April 10, 2002); See also Sen. Gordon Smith, Letter on 
Proposed Nonresident Alien Interest Reporting Rules (REG-133254-02) to Treasury 
Secretary John Snow, reprinted in the DAILY TAX REPORT, February 20, 2003 (urging 
Treasury not to move forward with interest reporting rules because it “would drive the 
savings of foreigners out of bank accounts in the United States and into bank accounts in 
other nations,” and expressing the Senator’s failure to understand “why we put the 
enforcement of other nations’ tax laws as a priority at Treasury.”) 
213 Perhaps recent efforts to create a multinational task force to combat abusive tax-
avoidance can provide the pressure needed to reform this long standing impasse.  See 
Sirena J. Scales, Multination Task Force Created to Combat Abusive Tax Avoidance, 2004 
TNT 81-4 (April 26, 2004). 
214 Moreover, to the extent that a U.S. tax treaty coordinates transfer pricing rules, a 
treaty might increase the taxation of a multinational that could otherwise benefit from 
conflicting domestic standards.  See Statement of Leslie B. Samuels, supra note 5. 
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The proliferation of tax incentives and tax holidays in LDCs coupled 
with deferral in the U.S. and opportunities for tax avoidance in both 
countries limits the need for tax treaties to relieve double taxation.  Since 
the 1950s, tax sparing has been promoted as a way to use tax treaties to 
increase investment to targeted LDCs, even in the absence of double 
taxation.215  Tax sparing prevents residence-country taxation of income 
exempted from tax by source countries,216 by providing that if a source 
country refrains from taxing income derived in its jurisdiction (usually 
pursuant to a tax holiday), the residence country nevertheless grants a tax 
credit for the tax nominally imposed.217   
Thus, under tax sparing, two taxing jurisdictions cooperate to exempt 
multinational companies from income taxation in both countries.  Although 
similar effects could be accomplished unilaterally by residence countries,218 
tax sparing is generally seen as a mechanism that should be offered in the 
context of a tax treaty, as a measure to encourage foreign investment to 
selected LDCs.219  Tax sparing has particularly been promoted as a vehicle 
for investment and aid to the nations of Sub-Saharan Africa.220  
 
 
215 See generally OECD, TAX SPARING: A RECONSIDERATION (1998).  Recent 
literature includes Brown, supra note 7; and Damien Laurey, Reexamining U.S. Tax 
Sparing Policy with Developing Countries: The Merits of Falling in Line with International 
Norms, 20 VA. TAX REV. 467 (2000) (arguing that LDCs “need tax holidays to attract 
foreign investment,” and therefore tax sparing is requisite to counter the effect of residual 
home country taxation under tax treaties).  Tax sparing is also defended as justifiable on 
grounds of capital import neutrality, on the basis that it allows American multinationals to 
compete with companies from other exemption-providing countries in the global 
marketplace.  See infra discussion at note 218.  However, tax sparing violates the concept 
of capital export neutrality, and has been consistently rejected by the Treasury Department 
on the grounds that tax treaties are supposed to relieve double taxation, not eliminate 
taxation altogether, and that tax treaties are not meant to provide benefits to U.S. persons.   
216 Tax sparing was first introduced in the U.K. by the British Royal Commission, 
which prepared a report in 1953 recommending tax sparing as a means of “aiding British 
investment abroad.”   Rejected by the U.K. in 1957 after several years of debate, tax 
sparing was enabled in U.K. tax treaties as a result of legislative action in 1961.  The 
purpose of the legislation was “enabling the U.K. to give relief to developing countries for 
taxes spared under foreign incentive programs.”  TAX SPARING: A RECONSIDERATION, 
supra note 215, at 15. 
217 Many examples and explanations of tax sparing exist.  For an overview of tax 
sparing, see Richard D. Kuhn, United States Tax Policy with Respect to LDCs, 32 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 262 (1963). (1963).   
218 For example, the U.S. could expand the definition of a creditable tax to include 
certain nominally-imposed taxes.  See, e.g., McDaniel (2003), supra note 252, at 268-269. 
219 For example, see proposals suggested by Brown, supra note 7, and Laurey, supra 
note 215, regarding the use of tax treaties to implement foreign aid initiatives by 
encouraging foreign investment through tax sparing.  See also J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., 
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However, there is little evidence that tax sparing increases foreign 
investment.221  In Ghana’s case, tax sparing provisions in its treaties with 
the U.K.222 and France223 have produced no significant increase in foreign 
investment from these countries.224  On the contrary, tax sparing could 
potentially decrease investment in LDCs, since it enables foreign investors 
to repatriate earnings that they would otherwise leave abroad under the 
protection of deferral.225  As such, tax sparing appears fundamentally 
                                                                                                                            
Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay 
Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299, 347 (2001) (suggesting that 
limiting tax sparing to its use in tax treaties “would allow appropriate distinctions to be 
made among nations and would assist the United States in negotiating appropriate 
reciprocal tax concessions for its residents”). 
220 Brown, supra note 7 (arguing for tax sparing in tax treaties specifically with Sub-
Saharan Africa). 
221 For an overview of the conflicting economic literature regarding the interaction of 
tax sparing and FDI, see McDaniel (2003), supra note 252, at 284. 
222 See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion With Respect to Taxes On Income and Capital Gains, 1993, Ghana-U.K., art. 25, 
para 4, S.I. 1993 No. 1800 (U.K. grants tax credits for Ghanaian tax paid including “any 
amount which would have been payable as Ghana tax for any year but for an exemption or 
reduction of tax granted for that year or any part thereof”); Convention for the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes On 
Income and Capital Gains, Nov. 29, 1977, Ghana-U.K., art. 21, para. 2, 1162 U.N.T.S. 341 
(same). 
223 See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion With Respect to Taxes On Income and On Capital Gains, Dec 4., 1992, Fr.-Ghana, 
art. 24, para 3, 94 TNI 74-25 (France grants tax credits for Ghanaian tax paid including 
“any amount which would have been payable as Ghana tax for any year but for an 
exemption or reduction of tax granted for that year”). 
224 See B. R. MITCHELL, INTERNATIONAL HISTORICAL STATISTICS, AFRICA, ASIA & 
OCEANIA, 1750-1988, at 499, 550-552 (1992); KWODWO EWUSI, STATISTICAL TABLES ON 
THE ECONOMY OF GHANA, 1950-1985 (Dec. 1986), at Table 155; and AGBODEKA, supra 
note 119.   
225 See, e.g., Peroni, Fleming & Shay (1999), supra note 67, at 469 (deferral 
encourages “[r]etention and reinvestment of earnings by foreign companies”); see also 
Laurey, supra note 215, at 484 (tax sparing would “allow U.S. multinationals to repatriate 
earnings based on business needs instead of on adverse tax consequences”). In a 2002 
study of the annual filings of the companies in the S&P 500, it was found that such 
companies had accumulated over $500 billion in un-repatriated foreign earnings.  Anne 
Swope, Bruce Kasman & Robert Mellman, Bringing It All Back Home: Repatriation 
Legislation’s Final Lap (JP Morgan Chase Bank, 2004), at www.morganmarkets.com).  
This figure represents a trend of ever-increasing “trapped” foreign profits.  Conversely, by 
acting as an incentive to repatriate capital, tax sparing may be advantageous to the U.S. 
economy even though it has long been rejected for policy reasons.  For example, in the 
context of the repeal of ETI, legislators proposed the enactment of a reduced rate of tax on 
repatriated profits, citing in support the need to direct capital back to the U.S in the quest to 
create jobs and boost the economy. 
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inconsistent with the goal of using tax treaties to increase investment flows 
from developed to less developed countries.  
Moreover, tax sparing increases tax competition by creating an 
additional disadvantage for countries that do not have tax holidays, while 
leaving countries that have a tax holiday in effect in the same or worse 
position as they were when only deferral was available.226  The OECD has 
initiated efforts to combat what it terms “harmful tax practices”—in 
essence, any tax regime that undermines residence-based taxation by 
providing tax breaks and refusing to cooperate in information sharing.227  
Persisting in the allowance of deferral and tax holidays and promotion of 
tax sparing seem equally inconsistent with the treaty-related goal of 
protecting residence-based tax bases. 
Foreseeing the surge in lobbying by U.S. multinationals upon the 
ratification of any treaty with tax sparing, the U.S. has been unequivocal in 
its rejection of these provisions.228  While the potentially negative impact on 
investment in LDCs is one valid reason why tax sparing should continue to 
be rejected, the primary position of the U.S. has been that tax sparing 
inappropriately allows the reduction of U.S. taxation of U.S. persons, a 
result specifically precluded by all U.S. treaties currently in force.229   
Some LDCs, notably those in Latin America, have terminated tax treaty 
negotiations with the U.S. over the issue of tax sparing.230  However, the 
U.S. position on tax sparing is only “one of several obstacles in the way of 
U.S.-developing country tax treaties.”231  In fact, tax sparing is largely 
unnecessary in the quest for complete non-taxation.  As discussed above, 
tax holidays granted by LDCs to investors from deferral-granting countries 
 
 
226 See, e.g., Margalioth (2003), supra note 81 at 198.   
227 See generally STAFF OF THE OECD FISCAL AFFAIRS COMM., THE OECD'S PROJECT 
ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: THE 2004 PROGRESS REPORT (2004). 
228 Tax sparing was contemplated but ultimately rejected in tax treaties with Egypt, 
India, and Israel, largely due to the efforts of Stanley Surrey, who argued vigorously 
against the provision.  See Laurey, supra note 215 (citing TAX SPARING: A 
RECONSIDERATION, supra note215, at 15-17).  Tax sparing was also introduced in a tax 
treaty with Pakistan, but a subsequent change in Pakistan law rendered the provision 
obsolete and the treaty entered into force without it. 
229 This rule is enforced under the “saving clause” found in all U.S. tax treaties.  See 
the US Model, art. 1, para. 4.   
230 Laurey, supra note 215, at 471, 493 (many LDCs have “refused to sign U.S. tax 
treaties that do not contain tax sparing clauses,” especially those in Latin America because 
this region “resents the U.S. [residence-based] tax policy”). 
231 McDaniel (2003), supra note 252, at 292. 
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such as the U.S. are effective so long as capital is reinvested rather than 
repatriated.232 
3. Domestic Tax Rates Equal to or Better Than Treaty Rates  
In treaties between developed countries, domestic tax regimes  are often 
significantly different than treaty-based tax regimes.233  This is especially 
the case with respect to tax rates on passive income paid to foreign persons, 
which are typically much higher under domestic statutes than under tax 
treaties.234  However, LDCs increasingly impose tax rates that are much 
closer to, and in some cases are less than, the typical rates provided in 
treaties.   
For example, dividends paid to foreign shareholders would normally be 
subject to a 10% tax in Ghana, unless the company paying the dividend 
operates in a free zone, in which case the tax rate may be zero.235  Thus 
Ghana’s statutory tax rate is the same as or less than what would be 
expected under the hypothetical Ghana-U.S. treaty outlined above.  In 
addition, Ghana’s internal rate is lower than the 15% maximum provided in 
the US Model for regular dividends.236 Nevertheless, it is higher with 
respect to direct dividends than the maximum 5% provided in the US Model 
and the zero rate for dividends paid to foreign controlling company 
shareholders found in  new treaties.   
Because most dividends paid out of Ghana would likely constitute direct 
dividends, many of which would be paid to controlling shareholders,237 a 
treaty rate that followed the US Model or recent U.S. treaty practice would 
reduce taxation on U.S. investors in Ghana from the internal rate of 10% (or 
zero)238 to 5% or zero.  However, as discussed above, if U.S. tax treaty 
precedent is followed, it is unlikely that a Ghana-U.S. tax treaty would 
 
 
232 Tillinghast (1996), supra note 62, at 478. 
233 Some countries have incorporated treaty concepts into their domestic laws.  For 
example, the U.K. and Italy have adopted permanent establishment thresholds for the 
taxation of business profits based on the OECD Model.  However, these examples are rare. 
234 OECD Model rates do not exceed 15% for dividends, 10% for interest, and 0 for 
royalties.  OECD Model, Art. 10, 11, and 12.  In contrast, maximum statutory tax rates in 
OECD countries average 18, 14, and 16% on dividends, interest, and royalties, 
respectively.  See generally, Ernst & Young, supra note 36. 
235 Ghana currently imposes a 10% tax on most dividends, but provides tax incentives, 
including exemptions of taxation on passive income paid by domestic companies to foreign 
investors, as described above.  See G.I.R.A. §§ 2 and see infra, text at notes 184 to 196. 
236 US Model, art. 10.   
237 See infra, text at note 182. 
238 The rate depends on whether the payment derives from sources protected by a free 
zone or tax holiday regime. 
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provide for these lower rates.  In fact, if a Ghana-U.S. tax treaty provided 
for regular dividend taxation lower than 10%, direct dividend taxation at 
5%, and no source country taxation of interest and royalties pursuant to the 
US Model, it would be the first and only U.S. tax treaty to do so with any 
country, developed or less developed.239 
If the U.S. provided as concession to Ghana that instead of a maximum 
5% rate for direct dividends, the maximum source-country rate would be 
10%, the result would only be that Ghana’s statutory 10% rate would be 
maintained.240  No benefit in the form of reduced taxation would be realized 
under this agreement.  In fact, if the recently concluded Sri-Lanka-U.S. 
treaty serves as a model, a Ghana-U.S. treaty could even provide for 
maximum rates that are higher than Ghana’s internal rates, though again 
this could hardly benefit current or potential investors.241 
Similarly, Ghana’s statutory rates of 5-10% on interest and 15% on 
rents and royalties242 comport with the average respective rates offered 
under other U.S. treaties, although the US Model contemplates zero source 
taxation of both.243  Just as in the case of direct dividends, preserving a 
 
 
239 The closest rates to these are found in the treaty with Russia, which provides for 
source country tax rates of 10% on regular dividends, 5% on direct dividends, and zero on 
interest and royalties.  Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Jun. 17, 1992, 
U.S.-Russ., TIAS.  To compare the rates in other treaties, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 
U.S. TAX TREATIES 33 (Internal Revenue Service Pub. 901, Rev. May, 2004) (note that 
although updated in May, 2004, this document has no information regarding the U.S. tax 
treaty with Sri Lanka (signed , entered into force Jun. 13, 2004). 
240 The treaty with Ghana would be one of six U.S. treaties with a top 10% rate for 
dividends.  See U.S. TAX TREATIES, supra note 239 at 33, 34 (providing 10% as the 
maximum tax rate on dividends in U.S. tax treaties with China, Japan, Mexico, Romania, 
and Russia)  
241 In the treaty with Sri-Lanka, the Joint Committee queries whether this is intended, 
and supposes that Sri Lanka could raise its rates up the maximum 15% provided, thereby 
increasing its revenues from foreign investment.  Yet in the same document, the Committee 
proclaims that the treaty will be good for the U.S. because it reduces Sri Lankan tax on 
U.S. investors and provides a clearer framework.  These two positions appear difficult to 
reconcile, as the Joint Committee appears to recognize.  See JOINT COMM. ON TAX., 
EXPLANATION OF SRI LANKA TREATY, supra note 130, at 62. 
242 Ghana currently imposes a 10% tax on most interest payments, and a 15% tax on 
rents and royalties, with alternate rates ranging from 5 to 15% for certain payments, 
depending on the residence of the recipient and the payor.  G.I.R.A. §§ 2, 84, and the First 
Schedule, Parts IV through VIII. 
243 With respect to interest, see US Model, art. 11.  Thirty-one existing U.S. treaties, 
including several of the most recently signed treaties and protocols, reflect this goal.  See, 
e.g., Japan-U.S. Treaty, art 11; U.S.-U.K. Treaty, art. 11; and Australia Protocol, art. 7.  
Interest tax rates range from 5 to 30% in the remaining treaties.  With respect to royalties, 
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higher rate of tax would be likely under UN Model standards, but would 
generally be a neutral factor for investors.   
Concessions that allow for higher source country taxation of passive 
income items reflect the concerns addressed by the UN Model regarding the 
worldwide allocation of tax revenues, and are meant to protect the taxing 
jurisdiction of capital importing nations like Ghana against the effects of the 
US and OECD Model treaties, which allocate income away from source and 
towards residence countries.244  However, as the case of Ghana illustrates, 
preserving higher source country taxation is a neutral measure at best, and it 
is contradictory to the notion otherwise promoted by U.S. policy makers 
that reducing tax rates will reduce tax barriers to direct investment and 
thereby increase capital flows between countries.   
To date, there is no consensus regarding the appropriate balance of 
attracting investment through lower tax rates and preserving the allocation 
of revenue to source countries.245  Preserving source country revenues has 
been prioritized on the grounds that low taxation has a deleterious effect on 
infrastructure.  In LDCs, providing adequate infrastructure to attract 
multinationals has been a continuous challenge that is further complicated 
by tax competition, a phenomenon not alleviated by tax treaties.  
4. Inadequate Infrastructure and Non-Tax Barriers  
U.S. investors may be significantly influenced in their investment 
location decisions by broad infrastructure-related criteria such as the rule of 
law and the protection of property, as well as the immediate need for a 
suitable workforce and adequate physical infrastructure.246  The need for a 
suitable workforce in turn necessitates basic infrastructure including social 
structures such as schools and health care systems.  In direct tension with 
these needs is the diminishing ability of LDCs to finance infrastructural 
development as they decrease taxes on business profits. 
Many countries, including Ghana, offer tax incentives such as tax 
holidays and tax-free zones because attracting investment to sustain 
                                                                                                                            
see US Model, art. 12.  Twenty-six existing U.S. treaties, including several of the most 
recently signed treaties and protocols, provide zero source country tax on most royalties.  
See, e.g., Japan-U.S. Treaty, art 12 and U.S.-U.K. Treaty, art. 12.  As in the case of interest, 
royalty tax rates range from 5 to 30% in the remaining treaties. 
244 See Dagan, supra note 41. 
245 The lack of consensus is illustrated by the omission of standard rates in the UN 
Model, Art. 10, 11, and 12. 
246 Hooke, supra note 119, at 47, 49.  A recent study found that the higher the average 
years of schooling of a  source country’s workforce, the more foreign investment tends to 
flow into such country. 
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economic development is deemed of greater importance than protecting tax 
revenues.247  However, there is little consensus regarding the effectiveness 
of tax incentives and tax holidays in actually attracting foreign investment.  
Anecdotal evidence from various countries suggests that providing tax 
incentives to attract foreign investment has failed to deliver the promised 
benefits.248  Despite a plethora of tax holidays and other tax incentives, few 
permanent employment opportunities have been created and exports have 
failed to increase in the many free zones located throughout West Africa, 
including Ghana.249  According to John Atta-Mills, former Commissioner of 
the Ghanaian IRS, “experience shows that tax holidays and tax reductions 
are ranked very low in the priority of investors in their choice of location 
for their business,” and that product demand, a skilled workforce, and 
infrastructure are more important to businesses.250  
Economic evidence regarding the connection between taxation and 
foreign investment provides little additional certainty.  A number of 
economic studies indicate that multinationals are very sensitive to tax 
considerations, and therefore corporate location decisions may be heavily 
influenced by tax regimes in  source countries.251  However, conflicting 
studies indicate that taxation is not a significant factor in the location 
decisions of U.S. multinationals.252  Instead, these studies argue that 
 
 
247 Brian Arnold, General Report 25, 28 in IFA REPORT ON TAX COMPETITION (IFA 
2001) (stating that “certain countries…are more concerned with attracting activity and 
investment of the multinationals in order to sustain their economic development”). 
248 See, e.g., Tamas Revesz, EU, Companies Urge Reform of Hungary's Local Industry 
Tax, 2004 WTD 97-10 (2004) (Although Slovakia offered big investment subsidies and tax 
relief for foreign investors, its budget is in ruins, and the resulting forced cuts in 
government spending (especially transfers to households) have triggered serious hunger 
riots among the most seriously hit Roma population.) 
249 Papa Demba Thiam, Market Access and Trade Development: Key Actors 97, 101, 
in TOWARDS A BETTER REGIONAL APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT IN WEST AFRICA (John 
Igue & Sunhilt Schumacher, eds., 1999).  See also text at note 112 (trade data indicates 
imports from Ghana to the U.S. are currently declining). 
250 Seth E. Terkper, Tax Measures in Ghana's 2004 Budget Inadequate, Opposition 
Party's Presidential Candidate Says, 2004 WTD 63-12 (April 1, 2004). 
251 For an overview of this economic literature, see Avi-Yonah (2000), supra note 158, 
at 1590-1592; James R. Hines Jr., Tax Policy and the Activities of Multinational 
Corporations, in FISCAL POLICY: LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC RESEARCH 401-445 (Alan J. 
Auerbach, ed., 1997); and James R. Hines, Jr., Lessons from Behavioral Responses to 
International Taxation, NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL, June 1999, 52 (2), 305-322. 
252 See Paul R. McDaniel, The U.S. Treatment of Foreign Source Income Earned in 
Developing Countries: A Policy Analysis, 35 G. 35 G. W. INTL. L. REV. 265, 280 (2003) 
(providing an overview of some of this literature); see also G. Peter Wilson, The Role of 
Taxes in Location and Sourcing Decisions, in Giovanni, Hubbard & Slemrod (1993), supra 
note 197 (arguing that taxes are more influential in location decisions for administrative 
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“market size, labor cost, infrastructure quality…and stable international 
relations,” among other considerations, are the most important factors for 
location decisions.253  Studies focused particularly on foreign investment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa come to the same conclusion.254 
In contrast, recent literature suggests that past studies present an 
incomplete picture of the role of taxation because they have focused on  
source country corporate income taxes, the burdens of which are relatively 
insignificant as compared to the burdens of non-income taxation in  source 
countries.255  As a result, these past studies may have obscured the more 
significant influence of non-income taxation on foreign investment 
decisions.256  Since foreign non-income tax burdens significantly exceed 
income tax burdens, these taxes may strongly influence the behavior of U.S. 
multinationals.257  The main explanation given for this influence is that non-
income taxation is not creditable against U.S. residual taxation.258   
The findings of this literature are consistent with earlier studies that 
suggest the relative importance of taxation in a particular country may be 
increasing with the availability of opportunities for avoiding taxation 
                                                                                                                            
and distribution centers, but they “inhere in but rarely dominate the decision process” in the 
case of production locations). 
253 Id.  
254 See, e.g., World Bank, WORLD BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT SURVEY 2000 (finding as a 
result of a survey of business including Ghana and 15 other Sub-Saharan African countries 
that firms investing in these regions indicate less sensitivity to taxation than to corruption, 
infrastructure, crime, inflation, financing, and political stability); Elizabeth Asiedu, On the 
Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries: Is Africa Different? 
(July 2001), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=280062 (arguing that location-specific factors such 
as natural resource availability may make infrastructure and stability of particular 
importance in the context of investment to Sub-Saharan Africa).   
255 Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines Jr., Foreign Direct Investment in a 
World of Multiple Taxes, xx J. PUB. ECON. xxx (2004)) (“foreign indirect tax obligations of 
American multinational firms are more than one and a half times their direct tax 
obligation”).  In previous studies, James Hines found a “small but significant” link between 
lower  source country taxes and foreign investment levels, as discussed in both McDaniel 
(2003), supra note 252 at 281, and Avi-Yonah (2000), supra note 158, at 1644. 
256 Desai & Hines (2004), supra note 255, at 34. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. (“Since American taxpayers can claim tax credits for income taxes paid to 
foreign governments, but are unable to claim similar tax credits for indirect taxes paid to 
foreign governments, it follows that foreign indirect taxes have much greater potential to 
influence their behavior”).  For an argument that the definition of creditable taxes should 
be broadened to encompass many non-income taxes, see Glenn E. Coven, International 
Comity and the Foreign Tax Credit: Crediting Nonconforming Taxes, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 83 
(1999).  
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elsewhere.259  However, these findings conflict with other studies that show 
multinationals can use debt financing and transfer pricing manipulation to 
achieve tax neutrality in investment location decisions,260 and that 
demonstrate, despite earlier studies showing a connection between tax and 
foreign direct investment, that non-tax factors dominate the location 
decisions of multinational firms.261 
Given the possibility that taxation may not be an overriding factor in 
foreign investment location decisions, the influence of infrastructure cannot 
be ignored.  To the extent infrastructure is important to potential investors, 
efforts to reduce taxation to attract foreign investment may be 
counterproductive, since raising sufficient revenues is integral to the level 
of infrastructure a country can offer. 262  As tax competition ensures less 
taxation of multinationals, the ability of LDCs to fund sufficient 
infrastructure to attract and sustain foreign investment relies more heavily 
on the ability to tax resident individuals, whether directly or indirectly.  
Historically, this has been a great challenge for LDCs.263   
 
 
259 See Altshuler, Grubert & Newlon, supra note 67 at 9, 22, 28 (suggesting that tax 
rates are extremely important to U.S. multinationals in allocating their foreign direct 
investment, especially in the case of manufacturing, and that the relative importance of 
taxes may be increasing) 
260 Avi-Yonah (1996), supra note 25, at 1315, Gary C. Hufbauer, U.S. Taxation of 
International Income: Blueprint for Reform 134 (1992) (suggesting that a multinational 
company can unilaterally achieve CEN “because it can make its investment decision 
without regard to the combined rates of tax”). 
261 Haroldene Wunder, The Effect of International Tax Policy on Business Location 
Decisions, TAX NOTES INT'L 1332 (Dec. 24, 2001) (updating the Grubert & Mutti 2000 
study). 
262 See Kaldor (1963), supra note 263 (stating that “the importance of public revenue 
to the underdeveloped countries can hardly be exaggerated if they are to achieve their 
hopes of accelerated economic progress”). See also David Rosenbloom, Response to “U.S. 
Tax Treatment of Foreign Source Income Earned in Developing Countries: Administration 
and Tax Treaty Issues,” 35 G. W. INTL. L. REV. 401, 406 (2003) (stating that “taxes are, by 
definition, involuntary exactions”).  Thailand has recently taken a slightly different 
approach.  In June, 2004, the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Education, and the Social and 
Human Development Services Ministry unveiled tax incentives for individuals and 
companies that make charitable donations to social development programs including 
education, museums, libraries, art galleries, recreational facilities, children's playgrounds, 
public parks, and sports arenas.   The government hopes that “these incentives will raise 
funds from the private sector to alleviate the poverty crisis in Thailand.”  Sirena J. Scales, 
Thai Government Announces Tax Incentives for Charitable Contributions, 2004 WTD 129-
10 (Jul. 6, 2004). 
263 Nicholas Kaldor, Will Underdeveloped Countries Learn to Tax?  41 FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS 410 (1963). 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art20
2005] Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid 59 
 
Compliance rates for income and non-income taxation are typically very 
low in Ghana.  It is estimated that 80% of business is conducted on the 
informal market—that is, not subject to regulation or taxation because it is 
conducted in the form of cash or barter.264  Thus, only those who work for 
the government or for the few companies that comply with wage 
withholding obligations pay their income taxes.265  An appearance that the 
laws are not applied uniformly may in turn lead to increased tax avoidance 
and evasion.266  The situation is exasperated when corruption or 
mismanagement of public funds also exists.  While Ghana’s corruption 
factor is relatively modest in comparison to many of its neighbors in Sub-
Saharan Africa,267 the notion persists that wealth can be achieved by 
becoming a government official.268  These perceptions plague the revenue 
collection efforts of tax agencies in LDCs such as Ghana.269     
 
 
264 The agricultural industry is thought to contribute significantly to this number, since 
over 60% of Ghana’s population is employed in agriculture (a slightly lower percentage 
than the average of approximately 70% in Sub-Saharan Africa).  WORLD FACTBOOK 2003, 
supra note 1, (Field Listing - Labor force), at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2095.html.  The informal economy 
also includes most professionals such as doctors and lawyers, most other service providers, 
and most shopkeepers and sellers of goods in local markets.  Interview with Justice 
Insaidoo, supra note 204; Interview with Sheila Minta, Solicitor/Barrister, Addae & Twum 
Company, Accra, Ghana, December 9, 2003 (notes on file with the author). 
265 Interview with Justice Insaidoo, supra note 204.   
266 Murphy (2004), supra note 206, at 201 (“perceptions of unfair treatment” appear to 
affect trust, and “taxpayer resistance could be sufficiently predicated by decreased levels of 
trust”).  
267 See Transparency International, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2003 215, 220, 225, 
264, at http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/download.htm (Suggesting that although the 
government faces much criticism in failing to address corruption within the civil service, 
prompting President Kufuor to promise an increase in accountability, Ghana’s perceived 
corruption is much lower than that of many of its neighbors in Sub-Saharan Africa).  In 
extreme comparison stands countries like the Congo, where corruption and bribery at all 
levels are openly acknowledged as requisite for survival.  See Davan Maharaj, When the 
push for survival is a full-time job, L.A. TIMES, Part A; Pg. 1, July 11, 2004 (while 
government employees are not paid a salary, they still show up for work every day to 
collect bribes ranging from “about $5 for a birth certificate to about $100 for an import 
license.”)  In Benin, a close neighbor to Ghana, bribes collected from traders trying to 
import illegal goods into Nigeria provide some 15% of the nation’s revenues.  Davan 
Maharaj, For sale -- cheap: 'Dead white men's clothing', L.A. TIMES, Part A; Pg. 1, July 
14, 2004. 
268 The phenomenon appears to exist throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.  See 
Transparency International, supra note 267.  In the Congo, it is said that “the only ones 
who have ever gotten rich are the leaders and those with connections.”  See Davan 
Maharaj, supra note 267.   
269 The perceptions of a few individuals cannot represent national sentiment, nor can 
such sentiment, even if widespread, indicate the accuracy of the charge.  However, a 
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The ability of LDCs to collect sufficient revenue to fund infrastructure 
is also challenged by international pressure to open markets and reduce 
trade barriers.270  To the extent that Ghana continues to rely heavily upon 
trade taxes for its revenue, recent developments in tariff reduction at the 
WTO may cause additional revenue shortfalls in the future.  Ghana also 
faces difficulty in finding consistent resources to fund infrastructure 
because success in collecting revenues from excise taxes, royalties, 
dividends, and similar payments may depend on fluctuating global market 
prices for exported commodities.   
Finally, Ghana’s ability to fund infrastructure is further subject to 
uncertainty due to its reliance on assistance from foreign donors.271  In 
2002, Ghana was the recipient of large amounts of foreign aid, much of 
which was connected to the peaceful transition of power through the 
democratic process.  However, foreign aid fell in 2003, and it is expected to 
                                                                                                                            
perception of unfairness and corruption may undermine the efficacy of a tax regime.  A 
study to quantify the effect of corruption on tax compliance is underway in Tanzania, and 
more research is needed in this area.  A further issue that may be significant to the tax 
collection efforts of LDCs is the perceived misuse of funds by the government, whether as 
a result of corruption or the ineptitude of officials.  Informally, this author heard many 
expressions of dissatisfaction with the ability of the government to provide necessary 
services to the citizenry.  Since that is a common complaint in developed countries as well, 
I do not deal with it here, but only note its existence as an additional potential difficulty in 
raising sufficient revenues from individuals.  Finally, the extent to which local conditions 
and attitudes regarding taxation affect the behavior of multinationals is not conclusively 
established.  It may be that multinationals generally conduct their business operations 
fundamentally in compliance with the laws in force, regardless of the degree to which their 
compliance is monitored or enforced, simply because their global operations may be 
subject to scrutiny by other governments or the public.  However, evidence proving (or 
disproving) this theory appears to be lacking in the economic literature.   
270 The transition of the U.S. from an agrarian society, “rich in resources but lacking in 
capital investment,” to an industrial one is credited in part to tariffs, without which the 
transition would have been much slower.  See Weisman (2002), supra note 158 at 14; see 
also William A. Lovett, Alfred Eckes Jr. & Richard L. Brinkman, U.S. TRADE POLICY: 
HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO 45 (2004) (the current association of free trade with 
rapid economic growth is “incompatible with American economic history,” which shows 
that “[t]he most rapid growth occurred during periods of high protectionism”). 
271 In Ghana, 17% of total revenue derives from non-tax sources.  86% of this amount 
(or just under 15% of total revenues) derives from grants; the other 14% derives from 
receipts from various fees charged by the government for particular services, and from 
amounts received in divestiture of state-owned enterprises).  Aryeetey, supra note 164, at 
30–31.  In this respect, Ghana is somewhat better off than many of the other LDCs in Sub-
Saharan Africa, which rely heavily on foreign aid to subsidize their expenditures.  For 
example, 53% of Uganda’s budget comes from external loans and grants.  See Gumisai 
Mutume, A New Anti-Poverty Remedy for Africa?, 16 AFRICA RECOVERY 4-12, at 
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol16no4/164povty.htm. 
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continue its decline as aid is targeted to other countries, notably Iraq.272  
The consequence is a current budget gap of over 14%.273  An increase in the 
overall level of funding by donor countries might alleviate the shortfall.274  
However, a subsequent change of policies by the aid donor could cripple the 
expectant aid recipient, as foreign aid typically substitutes for domestic 
revenue raising efforts rather than complementing them.275  
Multinational companies may be expected to increase the government’s 
ability to collect revenues by creating a larger wage base for personal 
income tax.  However, wages in LDCs such as Ghana average $1 per day, 
producing little for the government to share.276  If wages are raised through 
regulatory action, many multinationals may disengage to seek low wages 
elsewhere, since the low cost of labor is often a primary reason 
multinationals set up in LDCs.277  Although workers may individually 
benefit from employment created by foreign investment even if wages are 
only minimally higher than that offered by other local employment, they are 
not necessarily placed in a better position with respect to paying taxes.278 
Investment protection or insurance—whether made available through 
private or public institutions—may promote foreign investment despite a 
country’s infrastructural deficiencies.  In the U.S., investment protection is 
 
 
272 Aryeetey, supra note 164. 
273 Ghana’s 2002 budget provided for expected expenses of US$1.1 billion, including 
grants, and expected revenues of US$963 million, a 14% shortfall (all figures are based on 
current exchange rate of US$1 = Ghanaian ¢8,800). 
274 For example, as envisioned by the UN in the Millennium Development Goals. 
275 Kaldor (1963), supra note 263, at 410. 
276 44.8% of the population of Ghana lives on less than $1 per day; in all of Sub-
Saharan Africa, the figure is close to 46%.  See Patricia Kowsmann, World Bank Finds 
Global Poverty Down By Half Since 1981, UN NEWSWIRE, April 23, 2004, available at 
http://www.un.org/special-
rep/ohrlls/News_flash2004/23%20Apr%20World%20Bank%20Finds%20Global.htm.  
Globally, it is estimated that about half of the earth’s population lives on under $2 per day, 
a fact that has been central to the most recent efforts of the U.S. to combat poverty with 
new foreign aid strategies aimed at economic growth.  See, e.g., Colin L. Powell, Give Our 
Foreign Aid to Enterprising Nations, NEWSDAY (New York), A34, June 11, 2003 
(discussing the role of the Millennium Challenge Account in a new strategy of directing 
foreign aid to “support for sustainable development” in the face of the ongoing challenge of 
widespread global poverty).   
277 Hooke, supra note 119, at 18.  
278 Nicholas D. Kristof, Inviting All Democrats, THE NEW YORK TIMES, January 14, 
2004, Section A; Page 19; Column 5 (arguing that “the fundamental problem in the poor 
countries of Africa and Asia is not that sweatshops exploit too many workers; it’s that they 
don't exploit enough,” as illustrated by the example of a young Cambodian woman who 
averages 75 cents a day from picking through a garbage dump ad for whom “the idea of 
being exploited in a garment factory—working only six days a week, inside instead of in 
the broiling sun, for up to $2 a day—is a dream.”) 
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provided to U.S. investors through the United States Export-Import Bank ( 
“Ex-Im Bank”), an independent federal government agency that “assume[s] 
credit and country risks the private sector is unable or unwilling to accept,” 
through export credit insurance, loan guarantees, and direct loans to U.S 
businesses investing in foreign countries.279  For example, Ex-Im Bank 
insurance covers the risk of foreign buyers not paying bills owed to U.S. 
investors, the risk that a foreign government might restrict the U.S. 
company from converting foreign currency to U.S. currency, or even the 
risk of loss due to wars.280  This kind of investment protection in effect 
substitutes U.S. infrastructure for that existing in LDCs.281   
The Ex-Im Bank has a Sub-Saharan Africa Advisory Committee 
devoted specifically to supporting U.S. investment activity in this region.282  
With investment protection available as a substitute for infrastructural 
shortcomings, investment in LDCs like Ghana may not be prohibitive.  Yet, 
the persistently low level of foreign investment in Ghana and Sub-Saharan 
Africa as a whole suggests that investment protection is not enough to 
overcome the barriers perceived by potential investors. 
5. Entrenched Investor Perception 
Tax treaties with LDCs may provide little commercial benefit to 
investors when little or no income tax is imposed in these countries, so it is 
perhaps not surprising that they are correspondingly low on the list of U.S. 
treaty priorities.283  Nevertheless tax treaties continue to be promoted for 
their ability to increase investment between developed and less-developed 
 
 
279 See the United States Export-Import Bank website, available at 
http://www.exim.gov/.   
280 Id. 
281 The subsidy is not without controversy.  See. e.g., Heather Bennett, House OKs 
Measure to Block Loans to Companies Relocating in Tax Havens, 2004 TNI 138-4 (July 
19, 2004) (as part of a foreign aid bill, U.S. Export-Import Bank loans would no longer be 
made to corporate entities chartered in one of several listed tax havens because, according 
to Representative Sanders, who offered the bill, “companies that dodge U.S. taxes should 
not be rewarded with taxpayer handouts,” but should “go to the government” of the 
applicable tax haven for such privileges). 
282 See Ex-Im Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa Advisory Committee, at 
http://www.exim.gov/about/leadership/africa.htm. 
283 See Testimony of Barbara Angus, supra note 5 (stating that the United States 
generally does not “conclude tax treaties with jurisdictions that do not impose significant 
income taxes, because there is little possibility of the double taxation of income in the 
cross-border context that tax treaties are designed to address; with such jurisdictions, an 
agreement focused on the exchange of tax information can be very valuable in furthering 
the goal of reducing U.S. tax evasion.”). 
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countries.  One theory for their promotion is that increased investment can 
be expected due to the signaling effects of tax treaties.284  For example, it is 
suggested that tax treaties may signal a stable investment and business 
climate in which treaty partners express their dedication to protecting and 
fostering foreign investment.285   
Proponents of this argument suggest that in the process of negotiating a 
tax treaty, governments of LDCs may subject their operations to increased 
transparency and accountability, thus providing additional benefits to 
potential investors (as well as domestic taxpayers) in the form of assurances 
regarding the proper management of public goods.286  Thus, bilateral tax 
treaties may “serve largely to ‘signal that a country is willing to adopt the 
international norms’ regarding trade and investment, and hence, that the 
country is a safe place to invest, especially ‘in light of the historical 
 
 
284 Leif Mutén, Double Taxation Treaties Between Industrialised and Developing 
Countries, in DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES BETWEEN INDUSTRIALISED AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES; OECD AND UN MODELS, A COMPARISON 5, (Kluwer Law and Tax’n Pubs., 
1990). 
285 For example, the Secretary of the Treasury proclaimed the importance of signing a 
tax treaty with Honduras in 1956, stating that as the first treaty with any Latin American 
country, “The agreement may…have a value far beyond its immediate impact on the 
economic relations between the United States and Honduras.  It may generate among 
smaller countries an increased awareness of the need to create an economic atmosphere 
that will lend itself to increased private American investment and trade.”  Dulles, supra 
note 5, at 1444 (1962).  Similar sentiment has been expressed in the context of many 
treaties, especially those with LDCs, over the years.  See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX 
TREATY AND PROPOSED PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF 
VENEZUELA 61 (Comm. Print. 1999) (“the proposed treaty would provide benefits (as well 
as certainty) to taxpayers”); STAFF OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, 108TH 
CONG., TAXATION CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA 
(S. Exec. Rpt. 108-11, Mar. 18, 2004) (“in countries where an unstable political climate 
may result in rapid and unforeseen changes in economic and fiscal policy, a tax treaty can 
be especially valuable to U.S. companies, as the tax treaty may restrain the government 
from taking actions that would adversely impact U.S. firms”).  These concepts are also 
reflected in commentary.  See, e.g., ANDERSEN & BLESSING, supra note 10, at ¶ 1.02[3][b] 
(in the context of LDCs, “tax treaties provide foreign investors enhanced certainty about 
the taxation of the income from their investments”).  See also Davies, supra note 209. 
(“even a treaty that merely codifies the current practice reduces uncertainty for investors by 
lowering the likelihood that a government will unilaterally change its tax policy.”). 
286 See, e.g., Gabay (1990) (suggesting that the first advantage to a LDC of entering 
into a bilateral tax treaty is the negotiation process itself, because that process creates a 
degree of transparency, which in turn promotes “greater rationality in decision making,” 
which “can be of great economic benefit to the less developed country.”) 
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antipathy that many developing and transition countries have in the past 
exhibited to inward investment.’”287 
Signaling is a slippery concept because it is difficult to measure whether 
signaling is occurring and, if so, whether it impacts investors.  The potential 
for signaling a stable investment climate through tax treaties with LDCs in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is especially hampered by the persistence of negative 
perceptions about this region’s investment climate.288 Foreign investors in 
LDCs often take a regional, rather than national, approach, to investment, 
attributing the negative aspects of one country to others in the vicinity.289  
Since few Sub-Saharan African countries have tax treaties, and many 
countries in the region suffer from civil unrest and economic failure, 
Ghana’s ability to demonstrate stability and certainty may achieve little 
individual attention from foreign investors unfamiliar with its particular 
situation.290 
In addition, the signaling effect is tied to a country’s reputation in 
upholding its international compacts.  Short of terminating a treaty, there is 
no formal enforcement mechanism should a country proceed to ignore its 
treaty obligations.291  For example, it is difficult to imagine that a tax treaty 
 
 
287 Stewart (2003), supra note 4 at 148, citing Richard J. Vann, International Aspects 
of Income Tax, in 2 TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING 726 (Victor Thuronyi ed., 2000). 
288 See UNCTAD (1999), supra note 2 at 4, 16 (“little attempt is often made to 
differentiate between the individual situations of [the] more than 50 countries of the 
continent”). 
289 Laura Hildebrandt, Senegal Attracts Investors, But Slowly, 17 AFRICA RECOVERY 
2-15 (2003), at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol17no 2/172inv3.htm 
(“foreign investors tend to lump countries together in regions, without making much 
distinction among individual countries,” which might explain Senegal’s limited success in 
attracting foreign investment despite “relatively good infrastructure [and] a history of 
political stability and secular democracy, with decidedly pro-market leanings); UNCTAD 
(1999), supra note 2, at iv, 5 (“little attempt is often made to differentiate between the 
individual situations of more than 50 countries of the continent”). 
290 See, e.g., Laura Hildebrandt (2003), supra note 289, at 15 (“Senegal’s reputation 
for stability may be offset by conflicts elsewhere in the region, such as Cote d’Ivoire); A 
Man of Two Faces, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005, at 27 (“any …plan for Africa’s 
redemption will work only if functioning states with reasonably good leaders (South 
Africa, Botswana, Senegal, Ghana, Mozambique) can be set apart from the awful 
ones….”). 
291 In the case of a treaty violation, a taxpayer would request the Competent Authority 
of its home country to negotiate with the Competent Authority in the treaty partner country.  
For this reason, investors may desire a tax treaty to be in place, so that assistance in 
negotiating disputes with a foreign country could be sought from the U.S. Competent 
Authority.  However, treaties provide no recourse in the event the Competent Authorities 
fail to reach a resolution. 
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could independently create a sense of stability in a country that would 
otherwise be unattractive due to historical failure to protect property rights. 
Finally, treaty proponents point to the certainty achieved in establishing 
rules consistent with international norms, so that investors will know what 
to expect regarding the taxation of their investments in foreign countries.  
But signaling of certainty and stability is achieved more directly through 
agreements designed to provide these specific benefits.  For example, 
delivering these benefits is the primary purpose of investment protection 
provisions that are included in global and regional trade agreements.292 
They are also encompassed in a global network of over 2,100 bilateral 
investment protection treaties (BITs).293  Ghana has seventeen such treaties 
currently in force.294  The U.S. has 47 in force and relies on these 
agreements to protect investment in  source countries.295 
Investment protection provisions and treaties outline the applicable legal 
structure and regulatory framework of the signatory countries, and provide 
settlement provisions in the event of disputes between investors and  source 
country governments.  Common features include guarantees and 
compensation in the event of expropriation, guarantees of free transfers of 
funds and repatriations of capital and profits, and dispute settlement 
provisions.296  The goal of these agreements is to promote transparency, 
stability, and predictability for regulatory frameworks in  source countries, 
 
 
292 Stephen S. Golub, Measures of Restrictions on Inward Foreign Direct Investment 
for OECD Countries 6, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 357 (2003).  
Most of the LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Ghana, have signed multilateral 
agreements dealing with the protection of foreign investment, such as the Convention 
establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States.  See 
UNCTAD (1999), supra note 2, at 7-8. 
293 WIR 2003, supra note 113 at 89-90 (stating that BITs signal a country’s attitude 
towards and climate for foreign investment, and that investors “appear to regard BITs as 
part of a good investment framework”).  Worldwide, there are 2,181 BITs currently in 
force, encompassing 176 countries.  Id., at xvi.  As in the case of tax treaties, significantly 
more BITs would be required to achieve global coverage.  See supra, note 71. 
294 They are with Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, China, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, 
France, Germany, Guinea, India, Malaysia, Mauritius, Netherlands, Romania, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom.  See UNCTAD Bilateral Investment Treaty Database, available at 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779. 
295 Testimony of Shaun Donnelly (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 
Economic and Business Affairs , State Department), April 1, 2004, 2004 WL 724003 (
 F.D.C.H.) (“BITs have afforded important  protections to U.S. investors”).  The 
U.S. currently has four BITs with LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa: Cameroon, Mozambique, 
Senegal, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  For a list of U.S. BITs currently in 
force, see UNCTAD Bilateral Investment Treaty Database, supra note 294. 
296 WIR 2003, supra note 113 at 89. 
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and therefore reduce obstacles to the flow of foreign investment.297  BITs 
are further bolstered through subsidized loans, loan guarantees, and other 
financial assistance made available to foreign investors.298  
Even if the stability and certainty signaled by tax treaties could make a 
source country that has such agreements more attractive than one that does 
not, U.S. investors are unlikely to lobby for tax treaties if they do not have a 
direct financial interest at stake, namely, an exposure to taxation that could 
be alleviated by treaty.299   
The foreign investment patterns of U.S. businesses also imply that tax 
treaties may be an insufficient signal to investors.300  First, U.S. investors 
will pursue investments in a non-treaty country if the business environment 
is sufficiently attractive, even in the absence of a tax treaty.301  For example, 
although the U.S. has no treaty with Brazil,302 U.S. foreign direct 
investment in Brazil is significant.303  Second, the mere presence of a tax 
treaty will not generally overcome an otherwise poor business climate, or 
one that deteriorates after a treaty is in place.  For example, the U.S. treaty 
with Venezuela entered into force in 1999, but flows of U.S. capital to 
 
 
297 Id. 
298 See supra, note 279 (discussing the role of the U.S. Export-Import Bank in 
subsidizing U.S. investors to LDCs). 
299 The lobbying efforts of U.S. businesses may not be the most appropriate means of 
establishing a list of priorities for new treaties, however it is one of the primary factors 
considered by the office of International Tax Counsel in making such decisions.  See 
Testimony of Barbara Angus, supra note 5. 
300 See Mutén, supra note 284 at 4. 
301 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 85, at 4, 5 (arguing that tax treaties “make less 
difference to domestic taxpayers investing abroad,” especially if taxes are low in  source 
countries). 
302 Brazil is one of the South American countries that refuses to negotiate with the U.S. 
due to the tax sparing controversy.  See Laurey, supra note 215, at 493 (citing an 
unpublished Brazilian Tax Sparing Position Paper); Mitchell, supra note 11 at 213; 
Guttentag, supra note 4 at 451, 452.  The latest U.S. discussions with Brazil were held in 
1992.  As Brazil continued to insist on tax sparing and the U.S. refuses to continue 
negotiations with countries that insist on including such a provision, no further meetings 
are planned and there have been no recent activities to date.  See John Venuti, Manal S. 
Corwin, Steven R. Lainoff & Paul M. Schmidt, Current Status of U.S. Tax Treaties and 
International Agreements, 33-8 TAX MANAGEMENT INT’L J. 480, 483 (August 13, 2004) 
(updated monthly). 
303  As valued at historical cost (book value of U.S. direct investors’ equity in and net 
outstanding loans to Brazilian affiliates), U.S. foreign direct investment in Brazil is 
currently valued at $30 billion.  At 1.7% of total U.S. foreign direct investment, Brazil’s 
market for US foreign direct investment is not far behind that of some developed countries, 
including Spain (with 2.1% of U.S. foreign direct investment) and Australia (with 2.3%).  
Borga & Yorgason (2004), supra note 96, at 42, 49. 
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Venezuela subsequently dropped sharply due to “concerns over regulations 
and political instability in the country.”304   
Finally, some investors may not necessarily want a tax treaty because 
such agreements usually include measures that prevent tax evasion, as 
discussed above.305  Thus while a tax treaty may send positive signals to 
investors, they may as likely send negative signals to the extent they lead 
the way to stronger enforcement of tax laws.  Supporting tax evasion is 
clearly indefensible as a policy for encouraging investment in LDCs but the 
benefits of such opportunities to existing investors, and the cost of 
eliminating such opportunities, cannot be ignored.306  
Nevertheless, easing enforcement and administration of the tax laws 
may be an alternative reason to continue expanding the U.S. tax treaty 
network, from the perspective of potential LDC treaty partners.307  For 
example, the information exchange provisions might enable Ghana to 
extend its current, basically territorial, regime, to a worldwide regime.308  
 
 
304 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, FDI in brief: Venezuela 
(2003), available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_fdistat/docs/wid_ib_ve_en.pdf.   
305 In the past, tax treaties may have contributed to tax evasion by creating 
opportunities for “treaty shopping” through the use of multi-country tiered structures such 
as the one shut down in Aiken Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 TC 925 (1971).  In that 
case, the Honduras-U.S. treaty then in force was used to channel interest payments free of 
tax from the U.S. to the Bahamas.  The Honduras-U.S. treaty was terminated in 1966, 
before the case was decided but in connection with these kinds of structures, deemed to be 
void of any “economic or business purpose” by the Tax Court.  Treaty shopping has since 
been curtailed in newer treaties and protocols by means of stronger limitation of benefits 
provisions.  See Arnold (2001), supra note 247, at 73-74. 
306 Just as in the cases of deferral and bank secrecy, the private sector can be expected 
to protect tax advantages regardless of whether they comport with a coherent tax policy. 
307 Obtaining cooperation in tax enforcement through information sharing provisions is 
a major factor in the completion of treaties from the perspective of the U.S.  For example, 
the newly-ratified tax treaty with Sri Lanka was originally negotiated almost 20 years ago 
but only entered into force this year.  Ten years of the delay were due to Sri Lanka’s 
reluctance in accepting U.S. requests regarding information exchange.  See Colin L. 
Powell, Letters of Transmittal and Submittal, Doc 2004-7257 (Oct. 28, 2003).  The fact 
that, as in the case of Ghana, Sri Lanka’s statutory rates and tax incentive regimes indicate 
that the domestic tax regime is as or more favorable than that provided under treaty 
suggests that under that treaty, prevention of double taxation plays a much less significant 
role than prevention of tax evasion. 
308 See US Model, art. 26.  For example, when Venezuela entered into a tax treaty with 
the United States, its tax regime was territorial: Venezuela imposed no tax on the foreign 
income of its residents.  Its tax treaty with the U.S. included the typical exchange of 
information provision, which would theoretically allow Venezuela to pursue its residents 
who engaged in activities outside of the country, and Venezuela subsequently expanded its 
jurisdiction to encompass residence-based taxes.  Convention for the Avoidance of Double 
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The benefit of such a regime would depend on the amount of savings 
shifted to the United States by Ghanaian persons, before and after the treaty.  
Presumably this is a relatively tiny amount by global standards,309 but it 
might be significant to the overall revenue picture in Ghana.  However, 
Ghana’s limited tax treaty network significantly restricts the ability to 
enlarge its taxing jurisdiction, since Ghanaians could simply choose a 
location other than the U.S. for their offshore activities, avoiding Ghanaian 
tax even under a worldwide system.310   
Moreover, as in the case of investment protection, the benefits of 
information exchange are as readily—and more broadly—achieved through 
agreements specifically addressing this issue.  Information exchange is 
comprehensively addressed in TIEAs, which are generally bilateral, and 
through multilateral agreements such as the OECD Tax Information 
Exchange Agreement.311  Under the US Model TIEA, assistance in tax 
enforcement and collection are extended not only to income taxes but to 
other taxes as well, making such agreements potentially more effective than 
tax treaties in fulfilling the goal of improved tax administration and 
enforcement.312   
Absent reduction of double taxation, the non-commercial benefits of tax 
treaties appear incapable of independently exerting a significant influence 
on U.S. foreign investment, and some of the aspects of tax treaties may tend 
to discourage such investment.  Ultimately, the value of continued 
expansion of the U.S. tax treaty network to LDCs may therefore be 
                                                                                                                            
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and 
Capital, Jan. 25, 1999, U.S.-Venez., art. 27, TIAS.   
309 The U.S. Bureau of Economic Affairs compiles data regarding direct investment in 
the U.S., but Ghana is included only collectively with the rest of Africa excluding South 
Africa.  Inbound direct investment from this region is valued at $1.8 billion, which 
represents less than 0.2% of that from Europe.  Borga & Yorgason (2004), supra note 96, 
at 51. 
310 Ghana would not generally benefit from the larger U.S. tax treaty network since the 
exchange of information is limited to information that is relevant to the two contracting 
states only.  US Model, art. 24. 
311 This agreement has been signed by the U.S. and Canada, among others. 
312 The U.S. entered into tax treaties with many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and in 
the Caribbean simultaneously by territorial extension with their various colonial powers 
(from 1957-1958) and terminated most of these treaties simultaneously three decades later 
(in 1983-1984).  The U.S. subsequently entered into TIEAs only with the Caribbean 
nations.  The U.S. has trade agreements with countries in both the Caribbean and Sub-
Saharan Africa, sends foreign aid to both regions, and has expressed a desire to increase 
investment, trade and aid to both regions.  Yet there is no agreement on tax matters with 
respect to the LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art20
2005] Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid 69 
 
extremely limited in the context of a global tax climate that reflects the 
circumstances illustrated in this case study.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
The pursuit of tax treaties to achieve investment and aid goals is 
undermined by competing tax regimes, including domestic U.S. rules that 
provide relief of current U.S. tax burdens in respect of foreign income 
earned by multinationals.  To the extent multinationals can escape U.S. 
taxation simply by investing abroad, the U.S. fosters tax competition 
throughout the world as foreign countries compete to attract the U.S. capital 
fleeing taxation at home.  As a result of this international tax competition, 
and a corresponding divergence in tax mix between developed and less 
developed countries, much of the tax ostensibly relieved under tax treaties 
no longer exists to a significant extent with respect to investment in many 
LDCs.   
As a result, tax treaties with these countries may offer few commercial 
benefits to investors.  Tax treaties may provide non-commercial benefits to 
partner countries and investors, by signaling stability or suitability, or 
providing certainty.  However, these incidental benefits are likely 
insufficient to significantly impact investment in many LDCs, particularly 
those in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Thus, as the case study of Ghana 
demonstrates, much of the conventional wisdom about the impact of tax 
treaties on the global flow of investment does not apply in the context of 
many of the LDCs most in need of realizing these benefits.   
Tax treaties represent a significant opportunity cost for LDCs, diverting 
attention and resources away from the exploration of more direct ways to 
increase cross-border investment.  Thus, every potential tax treaty 
relationship with LDCs should be approached critically.  If a tax treaty 
cannot be expected to provide sufficient benefits to investors, it should not 
be pursued simply to include the target country in the network of treaty 
countries in a myopic adherence to traditional notions about the 
international tax and business community.  After decades of adherence to 
the promise of tax treaties, their inability to deliver in situations involving 
LDCs must be acknowledged.  If the U.S. is truly committed to increasing 
trade and investment to the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa, alternative ways 
to achieve these goals must be pursued. 
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